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Fiction in domestic tax law is a peculiar legal construct. Set in contradiction, the result is plainly 
counter-factual. The question arises as to what the fiction means when constructed in the 
context of tax treaties? This minor dissertation draws a comparative analysis between the 
statutory construction of two opposing international tax treaty cases, one more recent than the 
other, in regard to the effect of one particular fiction in domestic tax law – the ‘as if’.  
 
In 1997, the United Kingdom court of appeal ruled on Bricom Holdings Limited v IRC.  The 
finding from that decision surrounded the interpretation of the ‘as if’ fiction in British 
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules. In that case, the court found that the reference to 
‘as if’ was a purely notional definition based on fictional assumptions. These assumptions 
resulted in a product of artificial calculation, such that when constructed in CFC rules, resulted 
in a tax charge that was not a charge on the CFC’s actual income, but a notional amount based 
on a notional definition of that income. The notional amount could, therefore, not be provided 
relief by way of tax treaties. In 2000, South Africa followed the British court’s reasoning by 
updating its domestic Controlled Foreign Company rules with the same ‘as if’ terminology. 
 
In 2018, the principle which formulated that longstanding argument appeared to be rejected by 
the same British court in the decision of Fowler v HMRC. The court of appeal reached the 
opposite result by finding that the fiction arising from the ‘as if’ terminology did not represent 
a notional tax charge. Instead, the ‘as if’ assumption created a new and exclusive taxable 
subject matter on the same income source, alike to statutory deeming. The fictional income 
arising from that fictional treatment was the substitution of one (notional) source of taxable 
income for another (actual, but disregarded) source. The deemed character in the computation 
was, therefore, retained in tax treaties, allowing tax treaty relief. 
 
This minor dissertation analyses both cases in order to posit whether or not the net income 
imputed from South Africa’s CFC rules, using the same ‘as if’ terminology, may be construed 
as a deeming rule on the same CFC’s income. The finding in this minor dissertation is that an 
‘as if’ fiction may not represent a purely notional definition. The computation of CFC net 
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Legal fictions are peculiar intellectual constructs. They attach legal consequences and yet they 
are in clear opposition to fact and plainly self-contradictory.1 One example can be seen in the 
effect arising from the plain words ‘as if’. Alone, the words ‘as if’ are not self-evident and have 
no meaning without a given context. Rather, it is when ‘as if’ is woven between an opposing 
subject matter that the legislative instruction giving this fiction its explanatory power is created. 
 
In legal theory, the ‘as if’ fiction has long had its own theoretical underpinning.2 
Predominantly, writers on this subject refer to The Philosophy of the As-If by Vaihinger as 
well-known.3 The premise follows a simple logic:  
 
‘In a fiction we treat X as if it were Y to better understand…[X], we very well know that X 
actually is not Y or cannot be Y.’4 Rather, the legislative effect normatively makes X a Y.5 
 
The full effect of the ‘as if’ fiction above means that the same normative consequences which 
attach to Y, attach to X, because the fiction attaches to X.  X is, therefore, indistinguishable 
from Y from the point of view of the fiction.6 
 
Interestingly, the logic of this theoretical underpinning has not had the same consistent effect 
in both domestic tax law and tax treaties. In 1997, for example, a hallmark tax treaty case 
known as Bricom Holdings Limited v Inland Revenue Commissioner was decided by the United 
Kingdom court of appeal.7 The case surrounded a provision in the United Kingdom domestic 
tax law that contained an ‘as if’ fiction. This stated: 
 
‘…a sum equal to corporation tax…on that apportioned amount of profits…of a controlled 
foreign company…shall be assessed…from the resident company as if it were an amount of 
corporation tax chargeable on that company.’8 
                                                        
1 Christoph Kletzer 'Kelsen on Vaihinger' M. Del Mar & W. Twinnings (eds) Legal Fictions in Theory and 
Practice (Springer International Publishing 2015) Ch. 2, at 23-4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Bricom Holdings Ltd. v IRC 1997 (1) ITLR 365 (EWCA Civ).  






The taxpayer was a United Kingdom corporate resident assessed on the above provision. The 
taxpayer appealed the assessments finding that the ‘as if’ fiction meant that the sum ‘equal to’ 
corporation tax was charged on the profits of the controlled foreign company (CFC).9 The 
taxpayer claimed this had the effect that the CFC was assessed on double resident-based 
taxation and may be resolved by way of tax treaty.10 
 
The court, however, dismissed the appeal in a unanimous judgment, finding that the reference 
to ‘as if’ was a statutory hypothesis that represented an artificial calculation.11 The assumptions 
to which the actual profits were applied were not additional assumptions applied in 
combination with actual facts, instead, the profits to which the assumptions applied were 
substituted with notional definitions.12 
 
The result was that the subject matter arising from those assumptions had no identity 
whatsoever. The court, therefore, resolved that the fiction had nothing to do with the actual 
profits or actual residence of the foreign corporation.13 The fiction existed only as a measure 
of imputation, and therefore, had no effect in tax treaties. 
 
In 2000, South Africa updated its CFC legislation based on the Bricom judgment.14 This 
included the terms ‘equal to’ and ‘as if’ on a similar premise that the ‘as if’ was a notional 
measure.15 ‘As if’, however, is not defined in South African tax law. The common law meaning 
derived from the Bricom case has not been referred to or raised as a similar matter in South 
African courts. 
 
                                                        
9 Ibid at 379. 
10 Ibid at 376. 
11 Ibid at 376-7. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Annet Wanyana Oguttu ‘Resolving the Conflict Between Controlled Foreign Company Legislation and Tax 
Treaties: A South African Perspective’ (2009) 42(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa 73 at 103. 
15 See Chapter 2.2. Since 1988, ‘as if’ appeared in only three provisions in United Kingdom domestic tax law – 
see Daniel Sandler Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation Pushing the Boundaries vol 2 
(Kluwer Law International 1998) at 211 fn 75. It has, however, been litigated in all three occurrences. First in 
1994, section 419(1) – see Chapter 2.4.1 of this minor dissertation dealing with members loans in the Bracken 
case (non-tax-treaty decision). Second in CFC rules section 747(4)(a) in the Bricom case in 1997. Last in the 
Fowler case in 2018 regarding divers (a provision first appearing in 1988 in the former section 314(1)). The author 






In 2018, the difficulty of interpreting the effect of ‘as if’ resurfaced in the United Kingdom 
court of appeal. The decision in Fowler v Revenue and Customs Commissioners was a ruling 
that directly contrasted the court of appeal’s earlier view regarding the effect found in the 
Bricom matter.16 This decision was not unanimous, but the majority view is noteworthy insofar 
as what it said about the effect of constructing ‘as if’.  
 
The case dealt with a United Kingdom domestic tax law provision stating that employed 
commercial divers are ‘treated as’ carrying on a trade. The provision under consideration 
underwent a redraft in 2005 that replaced ‘as if’ with ‘treated as’. The explanatory note to the 
provision still referred to ‘as if’.17  
 
The taxpayer, a South African tax resident, was assessed on diving activities performed in the 
United Kingdom on the basis of employment income. The taxpayer appealed those assessments 
by raising the argument that the income was income from trade, which was how the United 
Kingdom treated it. As a non-resident in the United Kingdom, the business profit tax treaty 
article dealing with income from trade would exempt the taxpayer from the assessment.  
 
The question before the court was whether or not the distinction in language made any 
difference to the fictional assumption? The majority decision found that there was none. The 
terms ‘treated as’ and ‘as if’ were similar in their deeming nature, finding: 
 
‘The Income Tax Acts are directed to have effect ‘as if’ the performance by the relevant person 
of the specified duties of his employment ‘constituted the carrying on by him of a trade…The 
effect of this language was to create a deemed trade, which could not exist simultaneously with 
the taxpayer’s actual employment…a new source of taxable income was created, which 
supplanted his actual employment for all income tax purposes.’18 
 
The court held that the income from the ‘as if’ assumption was, therefore, the result of a 
‘deemed’ trade.19 The court’s reasoning was that the fictional assumption of trade could not co-
exist with the fact of employment. In that view, the court held that there was no doubt that the 
‘as if’ fiction could replace the same source of actual income for a fictional source.20 The 
                                                        
16 Fowler v HRMC 2018 EWCA Civ 2544. 
17 See John Avery Jones ‘Commentary’ in Fowler v Revenue and Customs Commissioners 2018 (21) ITLR 388 
(EWCA Civ) at 391. 
18 Fowler supra note 16 para 43. 
19 Ibid.  





income was, therefore, from a trade in both domestic tax law and in tax treaties, and exempt 
by way of tax treaty. Unlike the Bricom decision, however, this contrasting result meant that 
the fictional assumptions arising from the ‘as if’ did not have a notional consequence.  
 
The question arising in this minor dissertation, therefore, is what is the effect of the ‘as if’ 
fiction? On the one hand, the Bricom decision, which seems to be the view of South Africa, 
finds that the ‘as if’ was entirely notional. On the other hand, the Fowler decision held that the 
‘as if’ assumption was given a full fictional identity.  
 
In light of this distinction, a significant theme in this minor dissertation surrounds the statutory 
construction of fiction and fictional income arising from the ‘as if’ assumption in domestic tax 
law. Specifically, whether or not the fictional assumptions can be given an identity in tax 
treaties. This discussion follows the theoretical underpinning of Vaihinger, in that the subject 
matter X may assume the full identity indistinguishable from Y. 
 
Additionally, the view that the ‘as if’ fiction has a notional consequence in South African CFC 
rules is not settled.21 The wording of South African CFC rules is not clear on the issue.22 A 
similar issue to the Bricom case has not been litigated in South Africa. Whether or not ‘as if’ 
may be given the full effect is thus debated.  
 
1.2. The research problem 
 
In 2002, the interaction between South African CFC rules and tax treaties was briefly described 
in an explanatory memorandum issued by National Treasury.23 The memorandum stated: 
 
                                                        
21 See, for example, Anne Bennett & Le Roux Roelofse, Controlled Foreign Companies (SILKE on International 
Tax - Lexis Nexis 2017) ch 3 at 3.5.1; Lynette Olivier & Michael Honiball International Tax: A South African 
Perspective (5 edn, SiberInc 2011) at 608-9; Deborah Tickle ‘The Taxation Of Foreign Passive Income For 
Groups Of Companies’ (2013) 98A IFA Cahiers at 681 para 2; Oguttu, op cit note 14 at 76-7. 
22 Davis Tax Committee, DTC Report on OECD Action 3: Strengthening Controlled Foreign Company Rules 
(Annexure 3 Final Report 2016) at 6 point 4. Available:   
https://www.taxcom.org.za/docs/New_Folder3/5%20BEPS%20Final%20Report%20-%20Action%203.pdf, last 
accessed 30 June 2019.  
23 National Treasury, National Treasury’s Detailed Explanation to Section 9D of the Income Tax Act (National 
Treasury of South Africa 2002) at 2 para C. Available: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/tfsie/tax/legislation/Detailed%20Explanation%20to%20Section%209D%2





‘The CF[C] legislation taxes the resident shareholders of the CF[C], and not the CF[C] itself. 
As the same resident is not being taxed twice on the same amount, no double taxation arises. It 
therefore cannot be said that the CF[C] legislation overrides any double taxation agreements.’  
 
‘Where the resident shareholder is taxed on foreign amounts that are calculated according to 
proportional holdings in the CF[C], this would amount to economic double taxation in the 
absence of the granting of appropriate foreign tax credits and not juridical double taxation.’24 
 
This statement attests to the view that South African CFC rules do not tax the same taxpayer, 
on the assumption that double juridical taxation in tax treaties can only arise on the same 
taxpayer. It also says nothing of the nature of the ‘income’ that is taxed. That question, 
therefore, reverts to the effect of ‘as if’.25 When the use of ‘as if’ is given the fictional identity 
the same as that of the CFC, the same CFC’s income is taxed on the residence basis of taxation 
by one or more resident taxpayers in one or more Contracting States. This is termed a 
resident/resident-based attribution.26  
 
Resident/resident-based attributions appear to remain significantly unresolved on the 
objectionable basis that tax treaties relieve only juridical double taxation and that taxation of 
different persons on the same income is a form of economic double taxation.27 That proposition 
is furthermore, said to be descriptive, not normative; it is also incomplete because, as below, 
tax treaties already provide relief against the taxation of different taxpayers on the same 
income.28  
 
A recent example can be seen in the United Kingdom Supreme Court. In Anson v HMRC, the 
court found that tax treaty relief in cases of resident/resident-based attributions was dealt with 
by determining one critical point, namely ‘whether the income taxed in one country is the same 
as the income taxed in another’.29  
 
There Lord Reed in regard to model-based tax treaties states: 
 
                                                        
24 Ibid.   
25 Discussed in Chapters Two and Three. 
26 ‘Claims by different States to tax the same income on a residence basis arises where both attribute the income 
to the same taxpayer, whom both see as resident, or where each attributes the income to a different taxpayer, 
whom each sees as resident’, see ML Brabazon, Application of Tax Treaties to Fiscally Transparent Entities – 
Global Tax Treaty Commentaries (IBFD 2018) para 4.7. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  





‘The preamble does not indicate more precisely what is meant by double taxation: in particular, 
whether the Convention is restricted to “juridical double taxation”, or can also extend to 
“economic double taxation”.’30 
 
‘…there was no necessary implication that economic, as distinct from juridical, double taxation 
was not intended.’31 
 
‘[The] liability to UK tax is therefore computed by reference to the same income as was taxed 
in the US. [Mr Anson] accordingly qualifies for [treaty] relief…’32 
 
The position that tax treaties could accommodate different tax residents on the same income 
arose also in HMRC v Smallwood.33 There the United Kingdom court of appeal found that tax 
treaty relief in cases of resident/resident-based attributions concerned itself ‘only with the 
possibility of double tax charged on the same…[income], and not with the period of residence 
which gave rise to it’.34 
 
Lord Justice Patten finds: 
 
‘The question which this therefore raises (and critically in the present case) is how the [tax 
treaty] is intended to resolve residence/residence-based conflicts when the liability under the 
relevant domestic legislation does not depend upon concurrent periods of residence.’35 
 
‘There is no reason why the Treaty should not acknowledge it, without the need for the creation 
of the artificial deeming concept created by the Commissioners.’36 
 
This statement indicates that it may arise that a resident/resident-based attribution can 
reasonably be expected to occur from the results of different domestic tax regimes, concluding: 
 
‘[Tax treaties] must, I think, be construed as effective to deal with any liability to 
taxation…which either Contracting State may impose regardless of the basis of that charge 
under the domestic legislation in question… The definition of “resident of a Contracting State” 
in Article 4(1) reinforces this view by making “liability to taxation” by reason of residence the 
criterion for the taxation…This, I think, must denote what the Special Commissioners described 
as chargeability and not simply physical residence.’37 
 
                                                        
30 Ibid para 30. 
31 Ibid para 67. 
32 Ibid para 121. 
33 HMRC v Smallwood 2010 (EWCA Civ 778) EWCA Civ 778. 
34 Ibid paras 43-44. Although the final result dismissed the high court decision, the taxpayer applied the tax treaty 
to Mauritius income to which he was never resident. See comments by Philip Baker ‘Smallwood - The High Court 
Decision’ (2009) VIII.3 GITC Review at 16-17. 
35 HMRC v Smallwood supra note 33 at paras. 37 with whom Lord Justice Ward agrees at 72.1. 
36 Ibid at 34.  





Unlike Treasury’s view, the above discussion indicates that the same income rather than the 
same resident may be entitled to relief by way of tax treaties.38 Thus, the question that makes 
the Treasury’s view incomplete, is that an ‘as if’ fiction may result in a resident/resident-based 
attribution. To this end, there can be seen divergent views as to the plain effect of ‘as if’ as it 
arose in the cases of Bricom and Fowler respectively.  
 
1.3. Research questions 
 
For this minor dissertation, the question to be resolved is: 
 
Is ‘notional income’ that arises because of a statutory fiction the subject matter or not of South 
Africa’s model-based bilateral income tax treaties? 
 
To resolve this question, the following sub-questions are relevant: 
 
1) Is the ‘as if’ fiction notional income? 
2) If the ‘as if’ is not notional income, can the net income from CFC rules be reconciled 
to the rules of South Africa’s model-based bilateral tax treaties? 
 
1.4. Research method 
 
This minor dissertation follows the ordinary rules of interpretation for legal interpretative 
research. The method is doctrinal, and the research is analytical. In an analytical approach, the 
technical details are compared against legal principles.39 An analytical method prefers the 
functionality of legal theory so that the law is not confined to domestic nuances.40  
 
                                                        
38 Regarding the effect in tax treaties of the same income taxed by two different tax resident jurisdictions, see 
discussion in Chapter 4.4(a). For similar principles of fiscal transparency in South Africa, Smallwood supra note 
33 was cited with approval in Oceanic Trust Co Ltd No v CIR 2011 (15) ITLR 172 (ZAWCHC), which dealt with 
tax treaties and trusts; and J.J. Grundlingh v C.SARS 2009 ZAFSHC 88 which dealt with tax treaties and 
partnerships. 
39 See Carlo Garbarino ‘Comparative Taxation and Legal Theory: The Tax Design Case of the Transplant of 
General Anti-Avoidance Rules’ (2010) 11.2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 765 at 765. 
40 A similar example adapted in this research paper and regarding CFC rules appears in BJ Arnold ‘A Comparative 





The method is applied to the current drafting of South African CFC rules and the extent that 
these rules accord with the business profit article of South Africa’s tax treaties in the hands of 
the South African resident shareholder. The primary legislation focusses the above ambit to 
select portions of section 9D of South Africa’s Income Tax Act, 1962, and article 7(1) of South 
Africa’s OECD based tax treaties.  
 
Normative principles are derived from domestic and foreign cases. Foreign cases mainly refer 
to the United Kingdom, which are frequent sources of interpretative guidance in South Africa.41  
 
In addition, the articles and commentary to the OECD bilateral model tax convention are used 
to formulate certain arguments. In this regard, literature relevant to the subject matter of CFCs 
and statutory construction is also used. 
 
The OECD model tax convention (2017) applies as applicable. 
 
1.5. Structure of chapters 
 
This minor dissertation is divided into three additional chapters and a conclusion.  
 
Chapter Two introduces the divergent effect of an ‘as if’ fiction in the context of domestic tax 
law and tax treaties, by providing an alternative argument to the case of Bricom as it was found 
to be in the case of Fowler. A significant component of this chapter is also a critique to the 
findings of the Bricom decision.  
 
Chapter Three details the theoretical effect of the ‘as if’ fiction on the ordinary meaning of the 
fictional subject matter. It theorises that the plain meaning of ‘as if’ suggests a full transfer of 
fictional identity from one subject matter to another – thus, the fictional income may be 
provided its full ordinary meaning. This effect is similar to statutory deeming. 
 
Chapter Four consolidates the views from Chapters Two and Three in the form of a case study. 
It uses a hypothetical scenario of CFC ‘sales income’ and applies the methodology derived 
                                                        
41 R. Carvalho & I. Daniels & M. Dewar et al ‘Is there evidence of increasing harmonization in the interpretation 
of tax treaties by courts in their reference to foreign court decisions? A study of South African case law’ (2017) 





from the former Chapters to CFC rules and Article 7(1) of South Africa’s model-based tax 
treaties. The Chapter is in the vein of three alternative fact patterns introduced by the ‘as if’ 
fiction. In particular, the objective is to determine whether the income treatment in section 9D 
of the Act for resident/resident-based attributions conflicts with tax treaties. In concluding, the 
Chapter looks at the effect of CFC rules like transparent entities, and the tax ‘saving’ clause. 
 




This minor dissertation does not intend to conclude on section 9D and the application of tax 
treaties to it specifically. The ‘as if’ concept appearing in section 9D is used as an example to 
illustrate the difficulty that has arisen in the construction of these words and the resulting effect 
in tax treaties. The interaction between the ‘as if’ concept in the context of all wording in 
section 9D(2A) is not assessed in detail. Assessment of factual exemption of section 9D is 
omitted. 
 
This minor dissertation proceeds on the characterisation of the underlying income limited to 
Article 7(1) as detailed in Chapter Four.  
 
The conclusion that a CFC regime may constitute an ‘anti-avoidance’ rule is not established in 
this minor dissertation.42 It does not appear that the objective to fight against tax avoidance or 
evasion permits an immediate exception to the distributive provisions of tax treaties.43 The 
prevention of tax avoidance does not itself justify an interpretation that goes against the terms 
of such provisions.44 Avoidance is a factual assessment that must be proven.45 A test of 
avoidance is thus intentionally omitted and beyond the scope of this minor dissertation.  
                                                        
42 See OECD, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 - 2015 Final Report (OECD 
Publishing 2015) at 30 para 60. In South Africa - Davis Tax Committee op cit note 22 at 21 para 3. 
43 Re Société Schneider Electric 2002 4 ITLR 1077 (Conseil d’Etat (French Supreme Administrative Court)) ; L. 
De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse (IBFD 2007) at 63. 
44 Sasol Oil v C.SARS 2018 923/2017 (ZASCA 153) paras 60-61, 124-127. 





CHAPTER TWO – THE CONTRASTING VIEW TO THE NOTIONAL 




This Chapter provides a detailed contrast to the cases of Bricom and Fowler respectively to 
indicate the opposing effect that the construction of ‘as if’ has in domestic tax law. On the one 
hand, the ‘as if’ represented a notional definition in Bricom, and on the other, the ‘as if’ 
represented a deeming rule in Fowler. As a note, this Chapter also makes the occasional 
reference to tax treaties, although the focus is only illustrative; Chapter Four looks at the effect 
of tax treaties in detail.  
 
Additionally, because South Africa adopted the ‘as if’ fiction following the Bricom case, this 
chapter looks at the notional result in that case. Unlike Bricom, however, this chapter also 
considers that an ‘as if’ fiction may have an alternative meaning with a taxable identity that is 
not necessarily notional – a finding that arose from the Fowler case. These aspects are 
explained.  
 
2.2. The meaning of ‘as if’ in South African CFC rules 
 
In 2000, South Africa adopted a full CFC regime in section 9D of the South African Income 
Tax (the Act).46 The purpose was to tax the income owned by South African residents of foreign 
resident corporations in order to prevent tax deferral.47 There were, however, some drafting 
difficulties as tax treaties already acknowledged the corporate veil of foreign resident 
corporations.48 
 
                                                        
46 Act, 58 of 1962; Section 9D(2) of the Act, substituted with 9D(2A) with Taxation Laws Amendment Act, No. 
30 of 2000 and Revenue Laws Amendment Act, No. 59 of 2000; Oguttu, op cit note 14 at 103. 
47 See Treasury op cit note 23 at 1. Deferral (also used with terms such as diversion) has generally been seen to 
be the use of a lower tax jurisdiction to reduce the effective rate of taxation by delaying or eliminating the tax 
assessment in the jurisdiction with the higher rate - see Michael J. Graetz Foundations of International Taxation 
(Foundation Press 2003) 217-8 ; Alexander Rust ‘CFC Legislation and EC Law’ (2008) 36(11) Intertax 492 at 
492. 
48 See for example, the definition of person in Article 3(1)(a) which defines a person as an individual, company 





To align with tax treaties, South Africa could not directly tax foreign corporations on their 
foreign sourced income as the corporation itself had no direct taxing nexus to South Africa, 
even if South African residents had complete ownership of them.49  To remedy the problems 
associated with deferral, South Africa adopted a CFC regime that taxes the South African 
owners on their foreign income of their foreign entities as if those foreign entities immediately 
repatriated their foreign income when earned.50   
 
The former section 9C and the initial section 9D, repealed after the 9D update, were both 
legislated in the Act in 1997 and included deemed source rules for investment income to be 
taxable in the hands of the South African tax resident.51 In tax treaties, however, the result was 
not as settled. The direct taxation of the actual income of a CFC did not change the nature of 
that income, and thus, tax treaties may have rendered ineffective the sourcing rules as the same 
amount from the CFC was being taxed twice.52 This inefficiency was because tax treaties may 
have provided relief from the double taxation that arose based on the same income being taxed 
twice, and relieved the tax that was levied in CFC rules.53 
 
To effectuate the CFC methodology without the above position, the actual income in the 
foreign corporation and the tax on an amount based on that income had to be separated by way 
of a domestic statutory fiction. The fiction substituted an amount of actual CFC income with 
an amount of income without a discernible identity. The mechanics of this logic arose from the 
wording replicated from the decision of Bricom in the United Kingdom court of appeal.54 Of 
importance were the terms ‘equal to’ and ‘as if’ emerging from that case, the most significant 
of which was the effect of ‘as if’.  
 
                                                        
49 Treasury op cit note 23 at 1. 
50 Ibid.  
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in section 9C ; Annet Wanyana Oguttu ‘Ensuring a right balance in applying the residence and source bases of 
taxation’, 'Controlled foreign company provisions' in Johann Hattingh & Jennifer Roeleveld & Craig West, 
Income Tax in South Africa – the first 100 years 1914 to 2014 (Juta 2016) at 258-9. 
52 See for example, Oguttu, op cit note 14 at 103. The former 9D(2) had a direct basis of taxation on the same 
CFC’s actual income, stating: 
 
‘There shall be included in the income of any resident contemplated in the definition of a ‘controlled 
foreign entity’ in subsection (1), a proportional amount of any investment income received by or 
accrued to such entity.’ 
 
53 Oguttu in ibid at 102 stating relief from so called ‘economic double taxation’. See more recently, the cases of 
Anson supra note 29 and Smallwood supra note 33 referred to in Chapter 1.2 of this minor dissertation. 





The Bricom case found that the terms ‘equal to’ was a calculation based on an ‘as if’ definition, 
that was defined notionally.55 That is, that the actual income was not the subject of the tax, but 
rather, an amount based on the actual income – a product of artificial calculation.56  The ‘as if’, 
was not, therefore, the same income of the CFC.  
 
The tax resulting from that calculation meant that it represented what was termed a notional 
measure against the CFC’s actual income but did not tax it.57 Thus, ‘the income’ and the tax 
on ‘an amount based on that income’ were distinctive concepts created and introduced by the 
‘as if’ statutory fiction. The terms ‘equal to’ represented the tax calculation on a notional 
definition that had no identity to the CFC’s actual ‘income’.58 
 
The result of the above was that the notional sum calculated was no longer included in the 
scope of tax treaties because, while tax treaties could limit the actual taxation of the income 
itself, tax treaties did not scope in the tax on an amount based on that income.59 South Africa’s 
regime, therefore, followed a similar pattern. 
 
The above effect can be seen in the current definition of ‘net income’ as it exists today in 
section 9D(2A) of the Act.60 ‘Net income’ is defined as the taxable income for the shareholder 
of the CFC as: 
 
‘…an amount equal to the taxable income of that company determined in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act as if that controlled foreign company had been a taxpayer, and as if that 
company had been a resident for purposes of the definition of ‘gross income’’61 [emphasis 
added] 
 
There appear two ‘as if’ fictions to be given effect. In the Bricom view, these are notional 
definitions, which means they are based on assumptions of actual fact and actual income, but 
are not the tax on the actual fact and actual income itself. The first fiction is that the CFC is a 
taxpayer (notionally defined). The other is that the CFC is tax resident for the purposes of gross 
income – that is, the CFC has taxable income attributed to the resident shareholder (again, 
notionally defined).  
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Notably, the drafting technique in the above definition has a certain silence as to the nature of 
the actual income of the CFC and the effect of that amount for the shareholder. This is because 
the net income is an incomplete definition – meaning, that it simply provides the charging 
provision to scope in the taxable income of the CFC for the resident shareholder. This, 
however, necessitates determining what the net income of the CFC is – by referring to the 
CFC’s actual results and calculating the tax based on that income in the Act. 
 
Of critical importance, however, is the distinction in concept of actual income and notionally 
defined income arising from the ‘as if’ fiction. The notional definition represents a tax on what 
has been earned or generated by the CFC but as a notional amount of taxable income for the 
shareholder. This is unrelated to the actual income of the CFC.  
 
This means that the shareholder’s taxable income is determined with reference to any CFC it 
holds and the amount is calculated with reference to the CFC’s actual income in the same way 
as a South African resident taxpayer, that is, the net amount remaining after any deductions 
against gross income including deemed amounts, although that amount itself is notional.62  
 
From the above, the significance of the ‘as if’ as a notional statutory fiction so emerges, in 
order to produce the result that CFC rules are unaffected by tax treaties. 
 
In 2018, however, a contrasting theme which was developed from the case of Fowler 
considered the effect of the ‘as if’ as a deeming rule. If an ‘as if’ fiction is regarded as a deeming 
rule – it will negate the very concept of notionally defined income. The result is that the same 
income of the CFC is taxed on a world-wide basis without an intermediate step in the form of 
a third-party act, analogous to the declaration of a dividend from the CFC.63 This means that 
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the shareholder is taxed, depending on what the CFC’s net income is, directly on the actual 
‘income’ of the CFC.64 
 
In addition, when the same CFC’s income is taxed twice on a worldwide basis on two different 
tax residents, a resident/resident-based attribution may occur.65 In the case that tax treaties may 
apply to resident/resident-based attributions, tax treaties have their own sourcing rules and will 
attribute the amount of income through the distributive rules of tax treaties in order to determine 
how that amount will be taxed between the two contracting states.66 These views are expanded 
on in Chapters Three and Four, but the contrasting concept is that the effect of ‘as if’ may be 
regarded as both a notional rule or a deeming rule, the latter with significantly more complex 
results in tax treaties.  
 
This contrasting effect is explained below. 
 
2.3. The contrasting effect of ‘as if’ from the definition of ‘net income’ 
 
In 2002, National Treasury issued a detailed explanatory memorandum to CFC rules to explain 
the update.67 It begins with a simple fact pattern to indicate the method of attribution based on 
the CFC’s ‘net income’.68 
 
The example is that a South African resident holds the CFC’s shares. The resident transfers 
cash to buy bonds in the CFC. The only income generated in the CFC amounts to R100 of 
interest, which is reinvested by the CFC. Treasury states that section 9D does not tax the foreign 
entity on its R100 of interest, but taxes the South African resident ‘as if’ it earned R100 of a 
‘revenue nature’.69  
 
It appears that this follows the Bricom effect in that the ‘as if’ derogates from the identity of 
interest itself and assumes no identity. The logical corollary of the effect of the fiction in this 
                                                        
64 Ibid. Note that although the Fowler case did not deal with attributed income, that is, CFC income, the 
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in tax treaties.  
65 See Chapter 1.2. Anson supra note 29. 
66 Anson, ibid at 98. 
67 Treasury op cit note 21 at 1-2. 
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definition is that the resident shareholder taxpayer is taxed on R100 calculated based on 
interest, but is not interest itself. That is, the tax is on an amount defined notionally by reference 
to the term ‘as if’.  
 
If the ‘as if’ is not seen to be defining a notional amount, the product of the calculation is 
therefore not also a notional product. This follows from the basis that the amount taxed has the 
same identity as what is computed from the CFC. Using the contrasting view in Fowler means 
that the income taxed in the above example is an amount of interest income calculated in South 
Africa but attributed from the CFC. Thus, the amount of R100 taxable income represents R100 
of taxable interest taxed for the shareholder as it is earned by the CFC.  
 
The contrasting view as to how the ‘as if’ may support a notional and deeming rule, 
respectively, is explained below. 
 
2.4. The meaning of ‘as if’ in the Bricom case 
 
The Bricom case dealt with a Dutch CFC controlled by United Kingdom resident shareholders. 
CFC rules appeared in section 747(4)(a) of the United Kingdom Act (the United Kingdom Act) 
and stated: 
 
‘a sum equal to corporation tax…on that apportioned amount of profits…of a controlled foreign 
company…shall be assessed…from the resident company as if it were an amount of corporation 
tax chargeable on that company’70 
 
The 1980 United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty stated:  
 
‘interest arising in one of the States which is derived and beneficially owned by a resident of 
the other State shall be taxable only in that other State.’71,72 
 
‘Profits’, as above, were calculated based on various assumptions that referred back to the 
United Kingdom Income Tax Act.73 Like South Africa, the most significant assumption being 
that the chargeable ‘profits’ were determined on the basis that the CFC was tax resident in the 
United Kingdom. 
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Bricom Group Limited (BGL), a corporation resident in the United Kingdom, had a wholly 
owned CFC in the Netherlands, Spinneys. The only material income in Spinneys was interest 
on a loan advanced to BGL, which was taxed as such in the Netherlands. Tax assessments were 
issued to BGL on the ‘profits’ of Spinneys based on British CFC rules.  
 
From the above definition, British CFC rules taxed an amount ‘equal to’ the profits of the 
Dutch CFC and ‘as if’ it was an amount chargeable as corporation tax for the resident of the 
United Kingdom.74  
 
The taxpayers argument surrounded the assumption that the residence of the CFC in calculating 
the CFC charge, meant that the same CFC’s income was taxed in the United Kingdom. For tax 
treaty purposes, that argument was that it also had the effect that the CFC was taxed as a dual 
resident.75 BGL, therefore, appealed the assessments on the basis that ‘profits’ represented the 
interest income of Spinneys that was already taxed in the Netherlands. In addition, the tax treaty 
with the Netherlands exempted interest from tax in the United Kingdom. 
 
In the court of appeal there were two questions. The first was whether or not the amount taxed 
by British CFC rules on the ‘as if’ assumptions was the same CFC income exempted by way 
of the tax treaty? The second was if the CFC charge was a corporation tax? 
 
2.4.1. Was it the same income? 
 
In the United Kingdom, CFC rules appeared in section 747(4)(a) of the United Kingdom Act, 
and for which Section 754(2) stated: 
 
‘For the purposes of the Taxes Act, any sum assessable and recoverable under section 747(4)(a) 
shall be regarded as a corporation tax…’76 
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Section 788(3) of the United Kingdom Act provided that tax treaty relief was available to 
‘income tax and corporation tax’.77 BGL held that the tax charge therefore fell directly into tax 
treaties on the basis that the CFC calculation was ordinary corporation tax defined in the Act.78 
 
Initially, BGL appealed the tax assessments before the Special Commissioners on the basis that 
calculation meant that the CFC’s income had the same identity to the profits of the CFC.79 The 
Commissioners, however, found that a CFC rule was not a corporation tax, but a tax similar to 
it – ‘sui generis’.80 It was not, therefore, ordinary corporation tax, and not, therefore, a tax to 
which the tax treaty applied.81  
 
The Commissioners supported that finding with the domestic decision of Joint v Bracken 
Developments Ltd which had the terms ‘equal to’ and ‘as if’ similar in terminology to CFC 
rules.82 The Commissioners held that the case was an illustration that these terms necessarily 
implied that it was not a corporation tax and the income calculated had no identity.83 Thus, that 
income lost it identity for tax treaty purposes.84  
 
Bracken Developments Ltd dealt with interest on loans to members of private companies. The 
then section 419 of the Taxes Management Act, 1970, stated that: 
 
‘there shall be assessed on and recoverable from the company, as if it were an amount to 
corporation tax’; and 
 
 ‘an amount equal to such proportion of the amount of the loan or advance as it corresponds to 
the rate of advance corporation tax in force…’85  
 
In Bracken Developments, the manner that these two provisions integrated back into the Taxes 
Management Act was silent, and so the question was whether or not the amount of interest 
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from this provision was also interest that could be deducted by the company elsewhere in the 
Act?  
 
In that case, Vinelott J. found it was not, because the provision replaced corporation tax with a 
charge under that section.86 The case also referred to the earlier decision in Earlspring 
Properties Ltd. v Guest, where Vinelott J. reached the same conclusion,87 resolving: 
 
‘Although it is to be an amount corresponding to the rate of advance corporation tax, it is not 
itself advance corporation tax’88 
 
Thus, it was not itself corporation tax. The above finding was clearly a distinct fact pattern that 
may be distinguished from CFC rules, which already had a provision that stated that a CFC 
charge was corporation tax, as above. That, in effect, meant that the calculation of the CFC rule 
subjected the same CFC’s income to ordinary corporation tax on the basis it was taxable income 
in the Act for the resident corporation. BGL therefore appealed and the question, therefore, 
rearose in the court of appeal. 
 
The court of appeal approached the points of appeal separately. That is, it first dealt with 
whether or not it was the same income as the CFC for tax treaty purposes, and second, whether 
or not it was a corporation tax. The court eventually dismissed the first point of appeal, leaving 
the second unanswered. 
 
On the second point, the court reflected briefly on the Commissioners findings in an opening 
remark. That is, the court stated that, were the Commissioners correct in the assessment that 
no tax treaty relief was available to corporation tax, the United Kingdom was in breach of the 
Treaty in not giving effect to it under domestic law.89 
 
There Millet L. stated that there was force to the taxpayer’s argument that section 754(2) 
(which treated the CFC charge as corporation tax) was not given full effect.90 This can be seen 
in the finding that:  
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…[T]he Special Commissioners…held that the interest lost its character…I do not regard that 
as an accurate description of the statutory process…91 
 
Millet L., however, proceeded to agree that the Commissioners were correct to dismiss the 
taxpayer’s appeal, but for a very different reason. It found that the income character was not 
lost as interest, but simply, the CFC’s actual income was not included in the apportioned profits 
chargeable in CFC rules at all.92  
 
Millett L. held that the use of the ‘as if’ fiction introduced a hypothetical aspect to the ‘profits’, 
the assumptions of which were self-evident in that they were notionally defined.93 Millett L. 
found that the reason why CFC rules would have been drafted on fictional assumptions, one 
being that the CFC was a resident, was that a non-resident would not normally be subject to 
tax in the United Kingdom; this represented a purely a hypothetical basis of residence.94  
 
The definition of ‘profits’ in that context was, therefore, also purely hypothetical.95 That is, 
because the assumptions were counter factual, they arose only by substituting actual facts with 
fictional assumptions.96 They were not, therefore, additional assumptions that were determined 
on the CFC’s actual profits. Rather, the facts to which the CFC profits applied substituted fact 
for fiction.97 The tax was therefore a product of an artificial calculation with the result that the 
amount was a purely notional sum.98  
 
With reference to the actual CFC income, the court found that it was common ground that the 
interest paid to Spinney’s from BGL was the interest which was taxed in the Netherlands; the 
tax treaty exempted that income from being taxable in the United Kingdom.99 For the purposes 
of the CFC calculation, the ‘interest’ in the CFC rule was not the actual ‘interest’ from the 
CFC. It did not, therefore, have an identity of income for tax treaty purposes with the CFC. 
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To justify the above argument, the court had to disregard the provision that stated that a sum 
assessable under CFC rules was regarded as corporation tax, which was a materially significant 
provision for tax treaty purposes. The first was that ‘any sum assessable’ in CFC rules was 
corporation tax.100 The effect of the calculation took the same amount in the CFC, which was 
not taxable, and created taxable income in the United Kingdom. 
 
The second point was that the provision which incorporated tax treaties into the United 
Kingdom’s tax law stated that tax treaties provided relief from double taxation on ‘corporation 
tax’.101 Since a CFC charge was regarded as corporation tax, after it was calculated, it openly 
conflicted with the same provision which gave effect to tax treaties.  
 
The net effect of not giving effect to it was that it unilaterally swapped tax-exempt interest by 
way of the tax treaty, for United Kingdom taxable income. Additionally, because whatever the 
‘as if’ assumptions defined was also ordinary corporation tax, which gave effect to the fiction 
in the United Kingdom Act, there was never a distinction that the ‘as if’ was not the same 
income as that of the CFC. 
 
2.4.2. Was the ‘as if’ notional income? 
 
The question regarding the aspect of how ‘as if’ produced a ‘notional’ sum did not appear in 
the wording of the CFC legislation. That reference did appear in the CFC draft proposal in the 
November 1981 consultative document that used the term.102 The ‘notional’ reference in the 
draft version may attest to an interpretative ambiguity being included in the drafting of CFC 
rules since its adoption, and the court’s finding to that effect.103  
 
The draft did not match the CFC legislation that was eventually adopted.104 The proposal to 
adopt CFC legislation in the United Kingdom 1983 Finance Bill stated: 
 
‘Where, on such an apportionment of a controlled foreign company’s notional United Kingdom 
tax…an amount of notional tax is apportioned to a company resident in the United Kingdom 
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then… that apportioned amount of notional tax shall be assessed on and recoverable from the 
resident company as if it were an amount of corporation tax chargeable on the company.’105 
 
From that wording, ‘as if’ simply represented the plain language as to how the tax was 
attributed and collected from the resident, on the basis the amount was already a ‘notional tax’. 
That is, that a CFC tax was a notional tax (in source and in character) but the method of 
assessment and recovery from the shareholder was equivalent to corporation tax. A similar 
proposition was resubmitted in 1982.106 
 
In 1983, however, the CFC proposal underwent a redraft for inclusion in the 1984 Finance Bill. 
When it was published, the Act had a significant change to the basis of how the income of a 
CFC was to be taxed. It stated that the charge to tax on CFC rules was an amount based on an 
apportionment of the chargeable profits of the CFC, but it excluded the reference to the term  
‘notional’.107 The 1988 Act, unlike the proposals, stated: 
 
‘…a sum equal to corporation tax at the appropriate rate on that apportioned amount of profits, 
less the portion of the controlled foreign company's creditable tax for that period (if any) which 
is apportioned to the resident company, shall be assessed on and recoverable from the resident 
company as if it were an amount of corporation tax chargeable on that company...’108 
 
This provision indicated that the amount of corporation tax was determined based on the direct 
apportionment of CFC profits. It also stated that the CFC’s taxable income was an amount of 
corporation tax that was calculated in accordance with the Act. This directly contrasted the 
concept of ‘notional’ as it appeared in the draft proposal. 
 
The decision in Bricom that the use of the statutory language ‘as if’ was notional, therefore, 
appeared to revert to the logic provided by the statutory wording of the 1981 draft proposals.109 
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That contrasting result, however, may have disregarded the two essential components which 
gave effect to the CFC rules as they stood in the 1988 Act, which may have been the logic of 
the taxpayer’s submission when the case was heard.  
 
The first stage was ‘a sum equal to corporation tax at the appropriate rate on that apportioned 
amount of profits’. The second stage was ‘as if it were an amount of corporation tax chargeable 
on that company’. From the plain language, it did not appear to be clear that computing the 
CFC’s profits for the resident company ‘on that apportioned amount’ had any change on the 
underlying character of income or the nature of the income in the CFC. This reference was 
simply that the amount calculated above was an amount of corporation tax for the United 
Kingdom resident. To calculate the amount, the ‘as if’ fiction determined that basis by 
referencing to the hypothetical assumptions included in the Act. Those assumptions effectively 
brought the same income of the CFC into the Act as taxable income for the resident shareholder 
taxpayer. 
 
The taxpayer’s submission, therefore, followed this logic in the argument that the amount of 
profits must have been an amount of CFC profits, and, if the profits were that of the CFC, so 
was the sum which is apportioned to the taxpayer on which the tax is charged.110 This, in effect, 
simply supplemented the resident corporations tax liability with that of the CFC’s income.  
 
The taxpayer’s submission was certainly a logical argument that the deeming effect of 
calculating an amount based on the ‘as if’ assumption was not notional. The effect of the 
statutory language was therefore, not a clear indication that the character of the amount 
computed was lost in this process and neither that the fictional assumptions resulted in a purely 
notional sum. 
 
2.4.3. The interaction with tax treaties 
 
On the finding of notionally defined income, the question in tax treaties was rather limited. 
Bearing in mind that the notional income already overrode the provision that a sum assessable 
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under CFC rules was corporation tax, and that tax treaty relief was available in domestic law 
on corporation tax. The above findings were confirmed in the court’s unanimous view that: 
 
‘[A] Double Taxation Agreement can enure for the benefit of a third party…This would support 
the…present case if the rules deemed the income to be the income of the taxpayer…’111 
 
‘[B]ut where tax is charged on a conventional or notional sum which exists only as the product 
of a calculation, the fact that one of the elements in the calculation is measured by reference to 
the amount of exempted income does not make the exempted income the subject of the tax.’112 
 
The result was that the question of ‘real residence’ of the CFC for tax treaty purposes, and the 
question of its actual income, simply fell away.113 
 
The Bricom judgment brought about widespread criticism from commentators.114 Many 
criticised the court’s approach on the limited discussion surrounding the relevant tax treaty 
provisions on the basis the tax was in fact ordinary corporation tax, and, the finding that the 
Dutch entity’s ‘profits’ may not be ‘notional’ in that regard.115 Certain commentators found 
that the decision was wrongly decided.116 
 
In looking at the plain effect of the wording, the expressions ‘equal to’ and ‘as if’, merely 
calculated the amount of corporation tax payable in addition to any other sums payable by the 
company being assessed. The purpose and effect of CFC rules simply substituted the resident 
taxpayer with CFC’s income, that substitution had no change on the actual income. In this way, 
commentators have stated that it not convincing that the CFC’s taxable income is on the one 
hand, a notional sum, and yet on the other hand, has the same effect as any corporation tax.117 
From the above, the Bricom decision is, therefore, not unanimously shared by commentators 
as above, or by courts for that matter.118  
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2.5. Summary of the Bricom findings 
 
From the Bricom decision, it may appear to be an unusual result that the tax arising on an 
amount based on actual income is not also the same actual income that is taxable. The finding 
was that the concept of ‘notional’ meant that the ‘income’ could not be traced back to the same 
identity of the CFC.119  Thus, no part of the calculation of the definition of the CFC’s income 
arising from CFC rules could be attributable to any source.120 It could not, therefore, fall into 
tax treaties because the tax was not a tax on income that could be seen to be the state of the 
CFC.  
 
There appears to be no other authority that deals with that issue directly. That is, whether the 
tax on income and the tax on an amount based on that income are separate concepts. The 
relationship between the income and the taxable amount based on that income was not dealt 
with in any detail by the court of appeal in the Bricom case. It also appeared to be incomplete 
because that finding had to disregard the reference to a CFC rule being regarded as corporation 
tax.  
 
Interestingly, the court of appeal held that the above view was not absolute in the sense that 
tax treaties could enure for the benefit of a third part in the event that ‘[CFC] rules deemed the 
income to be the income of the taxpayer’.121 The question in that view is whether or not the 
effect of the ‘as if’ was any different to the effect of a deeming rule?122 This view is discussed 
next. 
 
2.6. The meaning of ‘as if’ in the Fowler case 
 
It was quite by chance that the Fowler decision came across a similar question and had to deal 
with the ‘as if’ fiction at the level of the court of appeal in 2018.123 The result is diametrically 
opposed to the Bricom decision. The case determined that the ‘as if’ may result in a deeming 
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rule, such that the tax on income and the tax based on that amount were not separate concepts. 
In the context of CFC rules, it is submitted that this may mean that it is an amount of the CFC’s 
actual profits and not a notional amount based on those profits that is taxed for the shareholder. 
This is discussed below. 
 
2.6.1. The tax based on an amount and the income itself are one and the same 
 
In the facts of the case, Mr Fowler was a South African tax resident. A tax assessment was 
issued to him on the basis of his employment income rendered in the North Sea of the United 
Kingdom. The issue surrounded the effect of ‘as if’ and ‘treated as’ which emerged as a 
consequence of an earlier update to the statutory language to section 15(2) of the Income Tax 
(Trading and Other Income) Act.124  
 
The ‘as if’ issue was addressed as the main judgment in the court of appeal, but it was also a 
minority view. Lord Justice Lewison who delivered the address did not have to deal with the 
issue at all because the ‘as if’ reference did not appear in the statutory provision to be 
considered. Instead, Lewison LJ referred to the effect of ‘as if’ in making the claim that the 
law did not change from the former drafting of the provision. 
 
In 2005, the provision in dispute stated: 
 
 ‘… [t]he performance of the duties of employment is instead treated for income tax purposes as the 
carrying on of a trade in the United Kingdom’125 
 
The same section in 2003, before it underwent a rewrite, stated: 
 
‘… the Income Tax Acts shall have effect as if the performance by that person of those duties 
constituted the carrying on by him of a trade …’126 
 
Mr. Fowler, therefore, appealed the assessments to the first tier tribunal on the grounds that the 
income was income from a trade, which was also how the United Kingdom domestic law had 
taxed it.  
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The first tier tribunal accepted Fowler’s submission that the income was trade. By doing so, 
the tribunal also rejected the submission of the counsel for the tax authorities.  The argument 
raised by counsel for the tax authorities was a similar theme to the Bricom analogy – that is, 
the argument that separated ‘what was taxed was employment income, and how it was taxed 
was as trade’ were necessarily distinct concepts.127  
 
In concluding, however, Judge Guy Brannan of the first tier tribunal rejected the submission 
that the meaning of a term and the tax treatment were separate concepts, finding that what gave 
rise to the tax charge was the meaning and not only a treatment for tax purposes.128  By 
deduction, the income and the tax treatment based on income were one and the same. It was, 
therefore, necessary not only to look to the tax treatment, but also to the meaning of that income 
or activity.129 The first tier tribunal found in favour of Mr Fowler and the tax authorities 
appealed the decision to the upper tier tribunal. 
 
The concepts of ‘as if’ and ‘notional’ proposition gained a considerable amount of attention 
the upper tier tribunal, without referring to the literal terminology. Honourable Marcus Smith 
referred to the separation of the ‘income itself’ from the ‘tax that was charged based on an 
amount of that income’ as the ‘status’ and ‘fruits derived from that status’ on the analogy that 
the two concepts were necessarily separable. That is, what was taxed on income was different 
to what was taxed on an amount based on that income.  
 
Smith H. held that the ‘status’ was employment, and what was taxed based on that status was 
employment income as the ‘fruits’.130 The fruits that were taxed as ‘trade’ had no impact on 
the status of employment. Smith H., in dismissing Mr Fowler’s appeal in favour of the tax 
authorities, noted that a fundamental error submitted by counsel for Mr Fowler was the claim 
that the nexus between ‘employment’ and ‘employment income’ was so close that they had to 
be read together.131 The upper tribunal did not agree with Fowler’s submission. The status and 
fruits could be separated, and thus, the tax on employment and the tax on employment income 
may be distinct concepts.  
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The upper tribunal, therefore, resolved that it was the status rather than the fruits that 
determined the basis of taxation in tax treaties, thus, it was employment (the status) and not 
employment income (notionally taxed as trade) that determined the scope of tax treaties. This 
argument was similar to the ‘as if’ analogy adopted in the Bricom view in that the employment 
income had a notional definition as trade (no identity), and the status as employment did not 
change. Mr Fowler disagreed and appealed the decision to the court of appeal.  
 
In the court of appeal the ‘as if’ terminology was referred to directly. The leading judgement 
of Lord Justice Lewison held that from the 2003 provision, the tax rewrite in 2005 did not 
intend changing the law.132 Lewison L.J. found that the effect of the fiction was not in doubt 
and generally was to be provided with the ordinary meaning of that fiction.133 Additionally, 
Lewison L.J. stated that the ‘as if’ as a fiction ‘does not, for example, deem the employment 
itself to be the carrying on of a trade’.134 This was the same view as the Bricom case, in that 
the ‘as if’ income was defined notionally. However, what was distinct from Bricom was that 
Lewison L.J still found that the ‘as if’ income had to be constructed for tax treaty purposes. 
 
Lewison L.J. referred to the 2003 drafting on the basis that the meaning of employment income 
did not change to a trade, but was computed ‘as if’ it were a trade. Lewison L.J. thus held that 
the provision correctly taxed what was regarded as employment and how it was taxed was as a 
‘pretend’ trade – a notional definition.135 This view was supported by the terminological 
reference to ‘as if’ that appeared in the explanatory note to the legislation, even though the 
2005 legislation did not make use of it.136 The weakness arising from that reasoning, as noted 
by commentators, was that the argument had to completely ignore the plain words ‘is instead 
treated as’ in the 2005 provision.137 The view of Lewison L.J., however, was on the basis that 
the 2003 provision indicated that what was taxed as employment was distinct to how it was 
taxed as employment income.138 
 
The majority judgement provided by Lord Justice Henderson with whom Lord Justice Baker 
agreed, therefore dissented, and necessarily, reverted to the older statutory text to contextualise 
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the view of Lewison L.J. The majority held that the terms ‘as if’ or ‘treated as’ had no 
discernible difference in the current context the words were used.139 By giving effect to the 
wording as they currently stood, it replaced the older version and the income in question had 
to be treated as income from a deemed trade to be given effect. 
 
The majority decision, therefore, agreed with the ordinary meaning provided by Mr Fowler’s 
reasoning, that the provision under consideration constituted a deemed trade.140 Henderson L.J. 
also concluded that this result would have been the same if the terms were ‘as if’ rather than 
‘treated as’ were used.141 Finding: 
 
‘It is not just a question of how Mr Fowler’s employment income is to be taxed. Rather, it is 
the substitution of one (notional) source of taxable income for another (actual, but disregarded) 
source…The drafting technique employed in that section is different…but in my view the 
substance is the same. The Income Tax Acts are directed to have effect ‘as if’ the performance 
by the relevant person of the specified duties of his employment ‘constituted the carrying on 
by him of a trade. The effect of this language was to create a deemed trade, which could not 
exist simultaneously with the taxpayer’s actual employment…His earnings from his actual 
employment (or the relevant part of it) must now be regarded for all income tax purposes as 
receipts of the deemed trade, which go into a computation of his trading income derived from 
that trade.’142 
 
Additionally, and in direct contrast to Millett L. in Bricom, Henderson L.J. found that the 
separation of ‘what is taxed’ and ‘how it was taxed’ was not a helpful distinction in the current 
context.143  
 
On the contrary, Henderson L.J found that the effect of deeming creates a new and exclusive 
taxable subject matter.144 The charge to tax on employment and the tax on employment income 
must be regarded for all income tax purposes as the carrying on of a deemed trade, which then 
go into the computation of trading income.145 It was, therefore, not possible to separate an 
amount of income from the tax on that income.  
 
Thus, the court resolved that the ‘as if’ in the current drafting, created a deemed trade. Unlike 
Bricom, however, the contrast arising from Fowler was that the terms ‘as if’ did not have a 
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notional consequence. The effect of the ‘as if’ in the Fowler context meant that employment 
became a trade and was taxed as a trade, rather than employment income being taxed based on 
a trade as a notional concept. In addition, it did not, therefore, separate a tax on actual income 
(employment) with a fictional amount of tax based on that income (trade) as distinct concepts. 
The fictional income and the tax on the fictional income were one and the same. The effect of  
fiction in Fowler therefore directly contrasts the proposition found in Bricom. 
 
2.6.2. The interaction with tax treaties 
 
A significant aspect to the court’s reasoning was that the reference to ‘for income tax purposes’ 
as it appeared in the provision, was ‘clearly wide enough’ to embrace tax treaties.146 Thus, the 
domestic fictional income imported that meaning into tax treaties.147 This was because tax 
treaties were enacted into domestic tax laws to be given effect by the tax arising in the United 
Kingdom. Additionally, the position in Fowler meant that the fiction of ‘as if’ retained the 
fictional character in tax treaties.148  
 
The above was a significant difference to the Bricom case – where the reference to ‘shall be 
regarded as corporation tax’ was disregarded despite tax treaties giving relief to corporation 
tax.149 The Fowler justification, is therefore, preferred as it gave effect to the statutory wording.  
 
The Fowler case provides an indication that the effect of ‘as if’ did not separate the income 
from the tax based on that income as separate concepts. On the contrary, the tax and the income 
were identical given that the plain effect of ‘as if’ was synonymous to deeming rules. Applying 
this methodology of the ‘as if’ to CFC rules, therefore, means the tax on the CFC’s actual 
income and the tax on an amount based on that income are identical concepts. 
 
2.7. A view that fictions are covered by tax treaties in South Africa 
  
The view that all South African taxes, including fictions, are covered by tax treaties is similar 
to the Fowler case, which found that the reference to ‘for income tax purposes’ meant that the 
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tax arising from domestic fictions could generally be embraced by tax treaties.150 In South 
Africa the interaction between tax treaties and the domestic tax laws are provided for in section 
108(1) of the Income Tax Act.151 Tax treaties are brought into operation and have the effect of 
law as if enacted into the Act.152 The Supreme Court of Appeal has affirmed that from the 
articles of tax treaties, the contracted parties intended that all South African income tax would 
be dealt with in one or other of the articles of tax treaties.153 This applies to ‘normal tax’, which 
includes the tax on capital gains.154 A CFC rule is normal tax. Tax treaties, therefore, provide 
the rules that are to be reconciled from all normal tax arising from the Income Tax Act.155  
 
The term ‘income’ is not defined in tax treaties.156 That is because ‘income’ refers to the tax 
on income that arises in the domestic tax law of the contracting states.157 In the South African 
Income Tax Act, ‘income’ can refer to anything that the Act says it is.158 In some cases, the 
Act generates ‘income’ as a fiction, which is a purely legal construct. For example, a taxpayers 
change of residence.159 There is nothing ‘actual’ about that ‘income’, and even the amount 
itself is nothing ‘actual’.  
 
The ‘income’ in tax treaties is, therefore, not actual either, because tax treaties apply to the 
same ‘income’ that has arisen as taxable ‘income’ in domestic tax law.160 Tax treaties rely on 
the domestic taxing rules in order to apply to all domestic taxes levied on ‘income’, irrespective 
of how the income is determined in domestic law.161 This effect means that tax treaties will 
treat the tax arising on fictional income the same as any other provision because the tax arising 
on that income is an actual tax charge the same as any other provision.162 
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2.8. Summary of Chapter Findings 
 
This chapter highlights two different approaches to ‘as if’ as determined by the above two 
cases. The 1997 Bricom decision resolved that the terms ‘as if’ represented a fiction that was 
defined notionally and that measured an amount based on income, but was not the income 
itself. The term ‘equal to’ follows the notional definition and indicated that it was not the same 
income but an amount calculated based on that notionally defined income.  
 
The case itself does not appear to be clear on this justification, at least not from the definition 
that it was also defined to be ordinary corporation tax, which had to be ignored. The tax and 
the tax on an amount based on that income did not appear to be different. Critics also questioned 
the idea that the notional sum could be separate from the actual income. 
 
The result, however, was that the ‘income’ in CFC rules was not the same income as that of 
the CFC, and secondly, not the actual income of the CFC. The aptly named ‘notional’ sum so 
emerged, which meant that the amount calculated based on the CFC had no identity or character 
to the CFC’s actual income. It was, therefore, not the same subject matter dealt with in tax 
treaties. 
 
The opposite view of the ‘as if’ as a deeming rule was derived in the Fowler decision in 2018. 
The view was unsupportive of the proposition that the income and the calculated amount of tax 
based on that income were capable of separation. The two could not exist as mutually exclusive 
concepts. This arose because the effect of deeming was to create a new and exclusive taxable 
subject matter such that the fiction substituted and replaced the actual facts. It was the new 
subject matter that was given effect for income tax purposes.  
 
Adopting this methodology in CFC rules means that the effect of ‘as if’ as a deeming rule 
directly taxes the same CFC’s actual income and calculates the tax on that same income on the 
basis that the CFC’s income is substituted for the South African shareholder. It could not then 
be a purely notional sum.  
 
The effect of giving effect to fiction in domestic law may occur because in South Africa, tax 
treaties can accommodate fictions because tax treaties are given effect by a domestic tax charge 






This chapter, therefore, determined that the income following an ‘as if’ fiction was not 
necessarily notional when the effect is a deeming rule. The next chapter, therefore, looks at the 





CHAPTER THREE – THE ORDINARY MEANING OF FICTIONAL 





This chapter builds on the findings of Chapter Two. A distinction arose in the Bricom and 
Fowler cases regarding the effect of ‘as if’ as a notional fiction or a deeming rule respectively.  
 
This chapter compares the theoretical view of the ‘as if’ fiction to the ordinary meaning of 
fictional income from statutory deeming rules using select case law. The objective of this 
chapter is to generalise the view that an ‘as if’ fiction may have a similar effect to deeming 
rules. The difference is simply a matter of expression of the term ‘as if’. This finding arises 
because the ‘as if’ supports the full transfer of identity of one income to another, which is also 
the theoretical view conceived by Vaihinger. 
 
3.2. The interpretation of fiction in Bricom and Fowler 
 
From Chapter two, both the Bricom and Fowler cases had to construct the ‘as if’ fiction. In 
Bricom, the effect was to calculate an amount of corporation tax based on fictional 
assumptions, including determining the amount based on the assumption that the CFC was 
regarded as tax resident in the United Kingdom. This can be seen in the below summary by 
Millett L.: 
 
‘It is critical to the taxpayer's argument that the assumption…that the company, which is ex 
hypothesi resident outside the United Kingdom…is also resident in the United Kingdom. I do 
not accept that proposition. The statutory assumption is ambiguous…In my judgment, the 
relevant assumption is that the company is instead resident in the United Kingdom. 
 
The scope of a deeming provision is a question of construction and is not subject to any special 
rule…A statutory hypothesis, no doubt, must not be carried further than the legislative purpose 
requires, but the extent to which it must be carried depends upon ascertaining what that purpose 
is. 
 
In the present case the purpose for which the assumptions are required is self-evident. As a non-
resident, it will not normally be subject to United Kingdom corporation tax and will have made 
no claim to relief from such tax…The assumptions which [CFC rules] requires are not 
additional assumptions to be made in combination with the actual facts. In relation to the 





the United Kingdom; this means that it had no profits actually chargeable to corporation tax; 
accordingly its chargeable profits are to be ascertained on the footing that it was resident in the 
United Kingdom instead. …There is no question of real residence.’163 
 
‘What is apportioned to the taxpayer and subjected to tax is not Spinneys' actual profits but a 
notional sum which is the product of an artificial calculation.’164 
 
From the above, Millett L. held that the domestic statutory fiction, ‘as if’ could not co-exist 
with the actual facts. Millett L., therefore, disregarded the full effect of the fictional 
assumptions on the basis that those assumptions did not replace the actual facts. The fictional 
assumptions only existed notionally. Thus, the purpose of the hypothetical assumptions of the 
fiction was ‘self-evident’ and did not question the ‘real’ residence of the CFC. This effect 
meant that the income based on the CFC was notionally defined and was not the same as that 
of the CFC. 
 
In Fowler, the fiction was that employment was regarded as trade for the United Kingdom tax 
calculation. The income from employment became income from trade. In this regard, the court 
of appeal found that the approach to deeming was not in doubt; the fiction was generally given 
the ordinary meaning in the context it was written.165 Henderson LJ states: 
 
‘The statute says that one must imagine a certain state of affairs. It does not say that, having 
done so, one must cause or permit one’s imagination to boggle, when it comes to the inevitable 
corollaries of that state of affairs… 
 
What, then, is the state of affairs which [the fiction] requires us to imagine…It is that the 
relevant duties of Mr Fowler’s actual employment are instead to be treated for income tax 
purposes as the carrying on of a trade in the UK.  
 
Accordingly, in the imaginary world which we have to enter, the actual earnings of Mr Fowler 
from his employment must instead be regarded as profits (or, more accurately, as receipts which 
form part of a computation of trading income) of the trade which he is now deemed to have 
carried on.’166 
 
‘Furthermore, to the extent that Mr Fowler’s activities were comprised in the deemed trade, 
they could not simultaneously be regarded for any income tax purposes as performance 
by him of the duties of his actual employment.’167 
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Henderson LJ., gave full effect to the fiction, stating that the effect was that the two 
assumptions could not exist simultaneously. The fiction, therefore, replaced the actual facts 
and the product of the fictional income was maintained. 
 
Both cases, therefore, approached the fiction in the same way in that it was not a special rule 
for domestic tax purposes, but the results were the complete opposite. To better understand the 
divergence, the below assessment begins with the theoretical effect of the ‘as if’ fiction. 
 
3.3. The effect of the theory of the ‘as if’ on the character of ‘income’ 
 
The view that fiction in tax law is not a special rule can best be explained in the formation of 
tax law. Tax law was established based on ‘income’ as an artificial conception because tax law 
never created the ‘income’ it taxed.168 Rather, ‘income’ was essentially an economic 
concept.169 Tax law, therefore, represented the legal construct of the economic exchange as the 
fiction of the fact itself. 
 
The effect of fiction in tax law is, in this view, no different to any other tax provision when the 
taxing system as a whole can be seen as a fiction.170 Thus, on this basis, fiction does not 
necessarily have any special effect or meaning other than what is described by the fiction. The 
cases of Bricom and Fowler, however, derived a difference of view to effect of the same ‘as if’ 
terminology. 
 
In so far as the effect of the ‘as if’ fiction is concerned, Chapter One introduced an example in 
legal theories referring to The Philosophy of the As-If by Vaihinger.171 The premise follows a 
simple logic:  
 
‘In a fiction we treat X as if it were Y to better understand [X], we very well know that X 
actually is not Y or cannot be Y.’172  
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The legislative effect of ‘as of’, because it is set in contradiction to actuality, creates the 
normative reality for something it is not.173 Without this contradiction, the ‘as if’ fiction would 
have no purpose. The effect is noted by Kelsen: 
 
‘When A is to be treated as if it were B, then by that he is not asking to treat A and B in order 
to better know A, even though we know A not to be B. Rather the legislative act normatively 
makes A a B. This means that the same normative consequences which are attached to B are by 
means of this “fiction” also attached to A. The legislator does not ask us to treat A “as if” it 
was a B, but asks us to treat A “just as” B.’174 
 
From the above statement, A is ‘just as’ B. The theory, therefore, determines that the ‘as if’ 
attaches the same normative consequences of B to A. To be effective, the ‘as if’ fiction relies 
on the importance of the subject matter of the wording of the provision accompanying the 
context in which the fiction is to be set. That is, the reference to ‘as if’ is not self-executing in 
the sense that without B the ‘as if’ has no meaning.  
 
Vaihinger develops four general characteristics as to why an ‘as if’ fiction is effective. These 
are: 
 
i. Fictions are a contradiction with reality;  
ii. Fictions are fundamentally provisional; 
iii. The fiction has to be expressly stated, and 
iv. The fiction has to be expedient.175 
 
Collectively, these traits provide the normative effect of an ‘as if’ by treating A ‘just as’ B. 
Points (i) and (ii) confirm that the ‘as if’ subject matter assumes a counter-factual identity given 
by the ‘as if’. In the above example, A is not B, but the ‘as if’ ‘makes’ A a B. This treatment is 
exclusive, specific and provisional, meaning that the fiction is assumed only for the purposes 
of A. On this point, however, it means that the fact of A and the fiction of A will necessarily 
coexist – the question is, which prevails for statutory construction? Points (iii) and (iv) answer 
that question.  
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Points (iii) and (iv) confirm that the ‘as if’ must expressly detail what the desired effect must 
be, in order to transfer the identity of one to the other. The instructed identity then substitutes 
the fact for fiction, that is to say, the factual identity of A is substituted with that of B. Since 
the ‘as if’ assumes a transfer of identity, any limitations within that transfer must also be 
expressly defined. 
 
The direct theoretical effect of ‘as if’ is that ‘when A is…treated as if it were B…the legislative 
act normatively makes A a B’.176 The result of the ‘as if’ theory is simply that, in one form or 
another, A is just as B, A is B, A is made a B, or A becomes a B.  
 
The theory suggests a full transfer and substitution of one subject matter based on another. In 
this way, the effect is similar to deeming rules in that it directly subjects to tax the consequences 
of B that attach to A but from the view of A. Stated in another way, it is the same as A having 
been taxed directly on B’s income or activity. The question of ‘actual’ and ‘fictional’ income 
in this regard, become one and the same. 
 
The ‘as if’ theory can be seen in any number of derivations of the above principle, both directly 
and indirectly for the taxpayer. The below examples are illustrations of this theory [note, the 
below hypotheticals contrast with the current effect and drafting of section 9D discussed in 
Chapter 2.2 to 2.3]. 
 
Assume the taxpayer is X, and because the assumption of ‘as if’ is a full transfer and 
substitution of the identity of one subject matter for another, there are a number of effects for 
taxpayer X, as below  
 
i. If taxpayer X has actual income A, that is taxed ‘as if’ it was income B, income A 
becomes B, and income A ceases to exist. This means that the income B is what is 
taxed for taxpayer X – logic in Fowler case 
ii. If taxpayer X has actual income arising from actual activity A, and actual activity A is 
taxed ‘as if’ it were fictional activity B, activity A becomes activity B, and activity A 
ceases to exist. This means that the actual income is regarded as the fictional activity 
from B, which is what is now taxed for taxpayer X – logic in Fowler case 
                                                        





iii. If taxpayer X has no actual income but is taxed ‘as if’ it were taxpayer Y who has 
actual income, this means that the actual income of taxpayer Y is what is taxed for 
taxpayer X – taxpayer’s submission in Bricom177 
iv. If taxpayer X is treated ‘as if’ it were taxpayer Y who has activity B, for taxpayer X, 
it is the same as saying the income from activity B is what is taxed for taxpayer X – 
taxpayer’s submission in Bricom regarding the effect of the fiction of dual residence/by 
deduction from Fowler case in (ii). 
 
What arises from the above scenarios in examples i and ii, is that the taxpayer has income that 
changes in identity because of an ‘as if’ fiction. The Fowler case provides an example of this, 
which accords to the above theory. The case found that A’s actual identity could not co-exist 
with the fictional identity given to A by B, and the fictional identity of A being ‘just as’ B, 
therefore, prevailed.178  
 
In the case of secondary taxpayers, that is, examples iii and iv above, when one taxpayer, X, is 
taxed based on the activity or income of another taxpayer, Y, the ‘as if’ fiction makes no 
distinction between X and Y as separate persons, and what results can be seen to be a direct 
attribution of that income or activity to taxpayer X. In the Bricom case, Millett L. appeared to 
endorse the above view, in the case of statutory deeming and the income held by deemed to be 
taxed for third parties, resolving: 
 
‘Exempt income does not change its character or lose its exemption merely because it is deemed 
to be the income of another person or is imputed to him….[A] Double Taxation Agreement can 
enure for the benefit of a third party…if the [domestic tax] rules deemed the income [of one 
taxpayer] to be the income of the taxpayer’179 
 
This theme emerged from the taxpayer’s argument by referring to the case of Hughes v Bank 
of New Zealand.180 The case indicated that interest from exempt securities did not cease to be 
as such by being included as a component element of a taxpayer’s calculated profits. If a 
taxpayer’s profits included any component element from another taxpayer, it was also the same 
nature of that element for that taxpayer. 
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Thus, unlike the Bricom decision, however, there does not appear to be a limitation to the effect 
of ‘as if’ from the above theory. The taxpayer’s submission in the Bricom case, therefore, 
presented a strong argument that the fictional language had the same full effect and was not  
notional – meaning, in CFC rules, that it was not merely a ‘sum equal to the apportioned part 
of the chargeable profits but the apportioned part of the chargeable profits itself’.181 The Fowler 
case in fact confirmed Vaihinger’s theory, by giving full effect to the ‘as if’ language by 
treating employment as trade.  
 
The view that fiction can be given a full effect is discussed next. 
 
3.4. A taxable fiction is provided an ordinary meaning unless it is qualified 
 
The above theory of ‘as if’ indicates that the ‘as if’ fiction can be given a full effect, that is, the 
ordinary meaning attributed to an ‘as if’ fiction is based on X assuming Y’s character of income 
or activity. Contrary to the Bricom view, the below authorities indicate that fiction in tax law 
can assume the full effect of an ordinary ‘fictional’ meaning provided by the plain statutory 
language, that is, the fiction is not a notional definition. 
 
In the House of Lords in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v Finsbury Borough Council for example, 
Lord Morton of Henryson details the difficulty of fictional terminology which is not guided by 
the statutory wording of the provision.182 The case had to determine the effect of the phrase: 
 
 ‘…the value which it would have if the whole of the damage had been made good before the 
date of the notice to treat.’183  
 
The statutory consideration regarded the consequences of a rebuilt building that was 
completely destroyed in war. The question was whether or not that building could still be 
subject to rent restrictions on the fiction that it had been repaired rather than rebuilt. If the 
building retained its former identity after it had been reconstructed, the former restrictions on 
rents would, therefore, continue to apply.  
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Morton L. resolved that the majority in the court of appeal involved reading the words as: 
 
‘…if the whole of the damage had been made good before the date of the notice to treat’ as if 
they had been ‘if the damage had never occurred’.184  
 
If it were read as if the damage had never occurred, it would mean that the fiction surrounding 
making good the property was unaffected by the notice to treat, which was what was required 
by the statutory wording of the provision. Morton L. found that the view of not giving effect 
to the words in question could not be justified when its departure was so far from the wording 
of the legislation that there was no context which allowed it.185  
 
Lord Aquith of Bishopstone agreed, finding –  
 
‘…nothing would have been easier than to provide that the value should be assessed as if no 
war damage had occurred’.186  
 
Aquith L. resolved that the meaning of the words was plain enough, and even if the ‘policy’ of 
the legislation could legitimately be invoked as an interpretative factor, it should not be used 
only to produce the desired result.187  
 
This logic can be compared to the decision in the Bricom case. In Bricom, Millett L. found that 
the statutory assumptions on which the fiction was based was ambiguous.188 Millett L. 
proceeded to read the fictional assumptions with the effect that it had the no ‘real’ meaning. 
Thus, if the counter argument runs on the logic of Lord Aquith’s view, that is to say, if it was 
to be fully ‘notional’, nothing would have been easier than to state ‘notional’ in the 
legislation.189 The draft CFC proposals did include that language, however, it did not match 
the CFC legislation ultimately adopted.190 The logic adopted in the Bricom decision did not, 
therefore, give full effect to any of the statutory assumptions even when no limitations were 
provided by the statutory wording. 
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In Fowler, Lord Justice Henderson in the majority judgement in the court of appeal, found that 
an ‘as if’ was a deeming rule, referring to the often-cited wording of decision of Lord Asquith 
as above.191 Lord Asquith found that when something is to be treated as real, it must also be 
imagined as real the consequences of treating it as such. Lord Asquith resolves: 
 
‘[When] the statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that 
having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the 
inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.’192 
 
This reasoning confirmed that the meaning provided by the statutory fiction was the ordinary 
meaning assumed for the purposes of the provision. A similar view referring to this dictum 
arose in the Marshall (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Kerr, a United Kingdom tax case dealing with 
capital gains.193 There, the court of appeal was unanimous in finding that the fiction was given 
an ordinary meaning.194   
 
Gibson J. states, in the leading judgement from the court of appeal, that a limitation could not 
be read into a tax provision unless the provision expressly stated it, finding that the purpose of 
a fiction may not always be clear, but the purpose must not be ‘self-fulfilling’.195 In the House 
of Lords, the Gibson J. methodology was approved.196 A good example that consolidates the 
above views is made from the below summary (in the author’s own words) to the approach to 
fiction derived in that case: 
 
‘I start with the issue of the approach to the construction of deeming provisions. IRC v 
Metrolands (Property) Ltd states that when considering the extent to which deeming provisions 
should apply, the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purpose and between what 
persons the statutory fiction is resorted to.197 If the fictional meaning would lead to an absurd 
result, unless its application is clearly be within the purpose of the fiction, it should be applied. 
It may not always be clear what the purpose of deeming is and if construction commences with 
a purposive approach there is a real danger that the purpose is a self-fulfilling assumption.  
 
I do not read Metrolands as laying down new law, requiring in the case of deeming, as the 
abandonment of the golden rule of statutory construction.198 That is to say construing the 
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grammatical and ordinary sense of the words to be adhered to. If the meaning of those words 
were cryptic or equivocal, it would no doubt be permissible to interpret them in light of a 
number of extrinsic considerations. Of course, if the policy of the Act and the purposes of the 
fiction can be derived from the wording of the Act, it is permissible to try to give meaning to 
that policy in a purposive approach.199  
 
For my part, I take the correct approach in construing deeming provisions to be to give the 
words used their ordinary and natural meaning unless prohibited from doing so. I further bear 
in mind that because one must treat as real that which is deemed to be so, one must treat as real 
the consequences and incidents inevitably flowing from or accompanying that deemed state of 
affairs. In particular, I have been unable to ascertain from the statutory language the limited 
purpose given by the statutory language. The fiction is not qualified in any way.200  
 
I see no proper basis for distinguishing computational purposes from other tax purposes in the 
absence of express words. I see no justification for deeming to apply for limited purposes. 
Plainly it applies.’201 
 
There does not, therefore, appear to be a general rule that a fiction is necessarily limited to a 
notional meaning as it were in the Bricom case.  
 
In the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, the case of Tradehold resolved that domestic 
fictions were not limited in meaning.202 The court reflected on the case of R v Norfolk County 
Council, where Cave J. stated: 
 
‘Generally speaking when you talk of a thing being deemed to be something, you do not mean 
to say that it is that which it is deemed to be. It is rather an admission that it is not what it is 
deemed to be and that, notwithstanding, it is not that particular thing, nevertheless it is deemed 
to be that thing.’ 203 
 
In addition, the court was referred to the case of New Union Goldfields Limited v Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue where van den Heever remarked: 
 
‘…once the Legislature “deems”, it departs from reality.’204 
 
The court resolved that no limitation could be read from these cases as to why the fiction had 
a limited meaning, finding that it would be ‘absurd’ if a fiction were not given effect like any 
other rule.205 
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Importantly, the latter of the above summary of Gibson J. states that there was no proper basis 
for distinguishing computational purposes from other tax purposes in the absence of express 
words. Meaning, the tax calculated on a fiction based on an amount and the actual income itself 
are not necessarily distinct concepts. 
 
In 2015, the United Kingdom Supreme Court ruled on an important development in this regard; 
the case surrounded the effect of calculating an amount ‘computed by reference to’ another as 
simply a plain term that means the income was ‘the same’.206 Thus, it is submitted that a 
calculation ‘equal to’ the CFC amount read with the ‘as if’ assumption is simply another means 
of taxing the same ‘income’ of a CFC. A tax charging provision would not, therefore, change 
the character of the underlying CFC’s income.207  
 
Thus, the difference in construction between the Fowler and Bricom cases is clear. The court 
in Bricom, found a limited basis of construction in that the use of ‘as if’ meant that anything 
that flowed from the ‘as if’ terminology was a notional definition. The fact that it is not the 
reality, however, supported the very purpose of the fiction and does not mean it has no real 
effect. The logic to the above cases, however, indicates that the effect of the fiction is given an 
ordinary meaning and full effect, unless it appears to be limited or qualified by the language 
itself.  
 
In addition, the theory to the ‘as if’ suggests a full transfer of identity from one subject matter 
to another, which is not limited to a notional meaning. This theory can be validated by case 
law on the matter of deeming and by giving full effect to the statutory fiction. The Fowler case 
finds the same logic and appears to affirm the view that the fiction could be given its ordinary 
meaning. 
 
Collating the above effect to that of the ‘as if’ fiction as viewed by Vaihinger, and the effect of 
‘as if’ derived in Fowler, it is submitted that the ‘as if’ has no limited meaning and, given a full 
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effect, may be provided with the ordinary meaning. A calculation based on an amount also 
represents ‘the same’ income. 
 
3.5. Applying the theory of the ‘as if’ fiction to South African CFC rules 
 
It is useful to revisit the definition of net income in South African CFC rules with the above 
view in mind. The definition of ‘net income’ in CFC rules was the tax charging provision and 
states: 
 
‘…an amount equal to the taxable income of that company determined in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act as if that controlled foreign company had been a taxpayer, and as if that 
company had been a resident for purposes of the definition of ‘gross income’’208 
 
Returning to the bonds example used by National Treasury209 read with the full effect of the 
‘as if’ as above, assume taxpayer Y is the CFC with interest income; taxpayer X is the South 
African tax resident shareholder of taxpayer Y.210 
 
The consequence of the above theory of ‘as if’ and the above definition means that the amount 
of  X’s taxable income is ‘as if’ it was Y. That effect is that X is taxed ‘just as’ Y. The question 
as to whether or not X is taxed on Y’s actual interest is self-evident and the direct consequence 
of taxing X as Y. This is irrespective of whether or not X has the actual interest of Y, since X 
has a fiction of Y’s interest, the purpose of which is to directly attribute the tax to X. 
 
Whether Y ‘pays’ interest to X fictionally and X is taxed on the fictional ‘receipt’ indirectly, 
or X is seen to be the holder of Y’s bonds fictionally and is taxed on the interest of Y directly, 
the tax consequences are one and the same. Thus, the question as to whether or not X is taxed 
on the same income as Y is the logical corollary of the fiction. In addition, the question as to 
whether X is seen to be taxed on the interest owned in Y is therefore, the logical corollary of 
the fiction. 
 
The same methodology can be extended to income from trade. If Y had a trade, the ‘income’ 
for X, because X is taxed ‘as if’ X was Y, means that X is taxed on an amount of profits from 
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Y’s trade. Thus, if a CFC has sales income, the resident shareholder is taxed on an amount of 
sales income. 
 
In certain cases, a taxpayer may be taxed on an amount based on one taxpayer, that deems that 
amount to be derived for the other taxpayer, akin to fiscally transparent entities.211 This means 
that for the taxpayer, a tax on sales income means that the sales were also deemed to be 
generated. In that case, the view is that X may carry on X’s own fictional trade because of the 
control of Y’s profits. The result is simply the view that the same income generated by the 
entity (the CFC) is taxed directly for the shareholder who controls it.212  
 
This also begs the question, if X and Y are separate taxpayers, and Y carries on a trade when 
X is taxed on taxable income ‘as if’ X was Y, the question is if there is a deemed trade that 
transfers to X or if it is just the deemed profits from Y that X is taxed on? This view is discussed 
in Chapter 4.213 It may be possible in those cases to argue that X has a deemed business as a 
result of controlling the income on Y’s business. 
 
In the approach of the Special Commissioners in the English case of IRC v Willoughby 
however, there was no transfer of character or activity -  
 
‘In my opinion there is a distinction between actual income of an individual and actual income 
of another person which is deemed to be the income of the individual. Such income is not 
industrial or commercial profits of the individual nor quoad the individual is it deemed to be 
industrial or commercial profits or deemed to be his income as if it were such profits.’214 
 
Although this case was eventually rejected in the House of Lords,215 it does not accord with 
what was endorsed in the court of appeal in Bricom, in that deeming rules did not change the 
fictional identity of the income even when deemed to be that of another person.216  
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In addition, on the Fowler decision, there has been some resistance that an ‘as if’ fiction could 
be a deeming rule. Certain United Kingdom commentators note: 
 
‘…I would respectfully doubt that as if creates a trade as a matter of domestic law…The 
Explanatory Note to s 12 [of the ITTOIA – the Fowler case dealt with s 15] which treats mines, 
quarries etc as if the concern were a trade says: 
 
Th[at] section does not deem the concern to be carrying on a trade. That section requires the 
taxpayer to be carrying on a trade as defined as defined in section 158(2) of TCGA…  
 
I suggest that the same would follow as a matter of treaty interpretation which is sensitive to 
nuances in the drafting of domestic law.’217 
 
The above view indicates that the ‘as if’ fiction does not have a full effect and deem the concern 
to be carrying on a trade. The court of appeal in the Fowler decision, however, appeared to 
accept the logic that ‘as if’ constituted a deemed trade for Mr Fowler, and therefore, the 
carrying on of a fictional trade.218 In addition, there does not appear to be a limitation that the 
fictional income cannot assume the ordinary meaning of that fiction, both from case law 
generally, and Vaihinger’s theory.  
 
The case of Fowler, therefore, confirms what the Bricom case did not – that is, that the fiction 
of ‘as if’ is not unlike deeming rules which can be given an ordinary meaning. Unlike the 
Bricom decision, however, case law has generally been susceptible to giving full effect to the 
ordinary meaning of fiction. 
 
3.6. Summary of findings and preliminary conclusions 
 
This chapter argued that the ‘as if’ fiction had an effect similar to a deeming rule. This view 
was reconciled from Vaihinger’s ‘as if’ theory, which determined that the effect of the ‘as if’ 
supported a full transfer of identity and substitution of one subject matter for another. Thus, if 
taxpayer X was taxed ‘as if’ it was taxpayer Y, the effect for taxpayer X was that it was seen 
to be ‘just as’ taxpayer Y. The result of the fiction was that the income of taxpayer Y became 
taxable for taxpayer X.  
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In this way, the question of whether or not the amount of tax calculated for taxpayer X 
represented the same income as that of Y was the logical corollary arising from the fiction that 
X was taxed ‘as if it was Y. In this view, the fictional ‘income’ was not a purely notional 
definition when the effect was that the income of Y simply became that of X. 
 
A number of tax cases referred to in this chapter supported the view that generally, fiction in 
tax law can provide the fictional ‘income’ with the ordinary meaning of that fiction. The 
theoretical result of ‘as if’ and the ordinary meaning associated with deeming rules are, 
therefore, similar conceptually since both aim to attribute a tax by way of fiction to the 
taxpayer. 
 
The above findings accord with the position that an ‘as if’ fiction can be provided the ordinary 
meaning of the fiction. That same view was the finding in the Fowler decision, which gave full 
effect to the ‘as if’ fiction as a deeming rule. Applying this view, therefore, confirms an 
important aspect about statutory fictions using the ‘as if’ terminology in South Africa CFC 
rules. The first is that South African CFC rules using the ‘as if’ terminology may support the 
full ordinary meaning of that fiction. Thus, a tax calculation based on another taxpayer simply 
means that the income or activity is taxed for that South African resident, being in a CFC rule, 
the resident shareholder. The result would not, therefore, appear to separate the ‘income’ and 
an amount taxed ‘based on income’ as it was in the Bricom case.  
 
By consolidating the above views in line with the Fowler decision and the basis of the theory 
of ‘as if’ by Vaihinger, this chapter concludes that, for the South African shareholder subject 
to CFC rules, the ‘as if’ results in the taxation on the deemed amount, being defined as the ‘net 
income’ of a CFC. The result is taxation on one resident taxpayer – the CFC, and taxation on 
that same income attributed to another taxpayer, the shareholder – a resident/resident-based 
form of double taxation therefore arises. The next question, which is answered in Chapter Four, 
follows the view that resident/resident based attributions can be accommodated in tax treaties 






CHAPTER FOUR – THE RECONCILIATION OF SOUTH 




The objective of this chapter is to reconcile the findings from the previous chapters into a 
hypothetical fact pattern concerning South African CFC rules and the rules of South Africa’s 
tax treaties. Based on the logic found in Chapter Three, a fiction can be given an ordinary 
meaning. If, therefore, the ‘as if’ can be seen to be a deeming rule, the amount determined in 
CFC rules may be the same income of the CFC and in the same character of CFC income for 
the shareholder. This chapter continues on this basis. The case study refers to Article 7(1) as 
used in the OECD model tax convention and South African tax treaties. This chapter concludes 
on any potential conflicts of CFC rules and tax treaties following this view. 
 
Thus, reading the definition of net income with the terms ‘as if’ simply means that the 
shareholder is taxed on an amount just as the CFC and just as the CFC was a tax resident 
taxpayer. That is, the shareholder is taxed on an amount of the same income of the CFC deemed 
to be that of the shareholder. It also means that the CFC’s income is taxed on a worldwide basis 
in South Africa.219 The most important question, therefore, surrounds how the same income of 
the CFC can be taxed consistently with tax treaties in South Africa. 
 
The definition of foreign company used in section 9D is defined as a company which has its 
effective management outside of South Africa.220 The same test generally establishes the tax 
residency of corporations for tax treaty purposes.221 Commentators note that CFC rules can, 
therefore, only apply to a shareholder if the foreign corporation is not a tax resident and remains 
a CFC after the effective management test for the purposes of tax treaties.222 In addition, the 
definition of control used in section 9D is directed at control of income and not control of 
management.223 The question is, therefore, not the determination of the tax residence of the 
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CFC for tax treaty purposes, but rather, how the income taxed for the shareholder based on the 
CFC can be reconciled to the rules of tax treaties. 
 
The solution, it is submitted, returns to the effect of a CFC rule when the amount determined 
by a CFC rule is the same CFC’s income attributed to the shareholder. This was the finding of 
the effect of the ‘as if’ as a deeming rule in Chapter Three. From Chapter One, a 
resident/resident-based attribution thus occurs – a similar issue was founded in the cases of 
Anson and Smallwood respectively.224 
 
Those cases resolved that tax treaty relief may be afforded to taxpayers when the tax in one 
state was computed with reference to the same income in the hands of two different taxpayers, 
and, when the one taxpayer’s income was used to determine the tax liability of the other. This 
effect is similar to the tax computed in CFC rules as above. The principle was that tax treaties 
could accommodate tax treaty relief  for both ‘economic’ and ‘juridical’ double taxation.225 
This Chapter indicates that Article 7(1) provides a strong indicator that this distinction becomes 
difficult to ascertain if one looks at the term enterprise in relation to CFC rules.226 
 
Chapter Three also determined two important findings akin to the above, firstly, that an ‘as if’ 
fiction may be seen as a deeming rule, and secondly, a deeming rule can provide the ordinary 
meaning of that income or activity to third party. Thus, tax treaties may also enure for the 
benefit of a third party, in the cases of so-called double economic taxation. 
 
The next section, therefore, provides a hypothetical scenario surrounding the effect of statutory 
deeming when the ‘as if’ is provided the ordinary meaning of the fictional income taxed by a 
CFC rule. The argument begins with a recent example of CFC rules appearing in the SCA in 
Sasol Oil v C.SARS.227 
 
4.2. The case study fact pattern 
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In 2018, the SCA ruled on its first CFC case in the context of simulated transactions. A simple 
example of potential double taxation may have arisen in the case of Sasol Oil v C.SARS on 
sales of crude oil connected to a CFC resident in the Isle of Man.228 The CFC was resident in 
the Isle of Man and taxed in that state at a lower rate of tax than South Africa. The case did not 
deal at any length with the discussion of CFC rules and tax treaties, since no treaty existed with 
the Isle of Man. The case is noteworthy, however, for what was said surrounding the basis of 
the tax assessment using section 9D.  
 
The South African Revenue Service sought to tax the sales of crude oil between the CFC and 
its connected parties using 9D to do so. Section 9D(9A)(a)(i)(aa) was a specific provision 
which disallowed the exemption from sales included in a foreign business establishment 
derived from resident connected persons of the CFC. The CFC would otherwise have been 
attributed an amount equating CFC ‘net income’ and the resident shareholder company in 
South Africa assessed on an amount equal to the sales less allowable expenses. The submission 
by the Commissioner was that the structure of the CFC avoided residence-based taxation in 
South Africa.229 Recall from Chapter Two and Three, that the effect of ‘as if’ when regarded 
as a deeming rule would determine this amount as the same as the sales income itself. 
 
The question follows this logic and posits the hypothetical position as to whether or not the 
sales amount may have been precluded from taxation in accordance with South Africa’s tax 
treaty obligations, had the CFC been disallowed the foreign business exemption and taxed in 
South Africa and, had there been a tax treaty with the Isle of Man? 
 
4.3. The interaction of section 9D and Article 7(1) 
 
The rules of section 9D 
 
From the above pattern, the CFC has actual sales income. For section 9D, if the ‘as if’ is given 
the full effect, for the resident shareholder it may arise that the ordinary meaning of net income 
may represent a deemed amount of the same CFC’s sales income. 
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The more complex question which arose in Chapter Three in the case of deemed profits was 
who was deemed to carry on the business associated with those profits?230 There were two 
potential views. Either the shareholder is taxed on the amount of CFC sales income and the 
CFC carries on the business, or, the shareholder is seen to carry on their own fictional business 
because of the profits attributed to the resident shareholder directly were controlled. As will be 
discussed below, Commentators and courts share mixed views surrounding this fictional effect 
in tax treaties.231 
 
The rules of Article 7(1) 
 
Article 7(1) of South Africa’s OECD model-based tax treaties follows the well-founded 
principles attributing income on business profits.232 It states: 
 
The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment 
situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable 
to the permanent establishment…may be taxed in that other State.233 
 
Article 7(1) provides both a basis of taxation in the form of article 5 dealing with permanent 
establishments, and avoidance of double taxation provided by the wording ‘shall be taxable 
only’, which mandates exclusive taxation in the state of the enterprise. This is because Article 
5, which includes the definition of the concept of permanent establishment, may be relevant in 
the determination of whether or not a CFC rule views the CFC as an enterprise that may be 
taxed in South Africa. The definition of permanent establishment in section 1 of the South 
African Income Tax Act establishes the same basis of taxation with reference to a permanent 
establishment, this states: 
 
‘[A] permanent establishment as defined from time to time in Article 5 of the Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development …’ 
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The term ‘profits’, the OECD has held, has not been a necessary definition in the model tax 
convention.234 This is because the term is an understood term to mean all income from the 
carrying on of an enterprise. The terms ‘enterprise’ and ‘enterprise of a Contracting State’ 
therefore appear in article 7(1) of the model tax convention. Article 3(1) defines the term 
enterprise as the carrying on of any business, and enterprise of a contracting state as the 
carrying on of any business by a resident of a contracting state.235  
 
Thus, the importance of who carries on a business for the purposes of tax treaties therefore 
emerges.236 Commentators have found that for this reason there exists a long history to whether 
or not the effect of domestic CFC rules conflicted with tax treaties based on the OECD model 
tax convention, particularly Article 7(1).237 Lang highlights the potential issue: 
 
‘The legal consequences provided by the distributive rules [of tax treaties] apply to the persons 
who are resident in accordance with the tax treaty to the extent that income was attributed to them 
pursuant to domestic law. There has been some debate whether this is different for Art. 7(1) since 
Art. 7(1) refers to “profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State” and seems to imply that, for 
purposes of attributing corporate profits, Art. 7 does not make a distinction based on the taxpayer 
to whom the income was attributed pursuant to domestic law.’238 
 
The above argument appears to introduce the theme that article 7(1) may relieve double 
economic taxation arising from CFC rules without difficulty. This is because article 7(1) may 
apply to the term profits of an enterprise of a contracting state without drawing a distinction 
as to the taxpayer taxed on the profits.  
 
For the shareholder as the resident taxpayer, enterprise in article 3(1)(c) of the model tax 
convention means the carrying on of any business,239 and article 3(1)(d) states that the 
enterprise of a contracting state means the enterprise carried on by a resident,240 it appears that 
the shareholder must carry on the enterprise of the CFC and not only have an amount of profits 
of the CFC enterprise to be taxed therein. In that view, article 7(1) may apply to protect 
different taxpayers based on the income from the same enterprise, because the basis of 
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taxability set by tax treaties is that the profits of an enterprise must be an enterprise carried on 
by the resident, rather than merely profits attributed to that resident. 
 
It is submitted, that the most important question arising from a CFC fiction is, therefore, who 
is seen to carry on the enterprise on the amount of CFC imputed business profits (sales)? 
 
4.4. Who has an enterprise for the purposes of a CFC rule? 
 
In tax treaties, there are three possibilities for the shareholder who calculates their tax liability 
based on a CFC rule: 
 
a) Is the resident shareholder the enterprise (and the CFC fiscally transparent)? 
b) Is the CFC the enterprise, and is there a potential conflict with article 7(1) and the basis 
of taxation set by the definition of permanent establishment? 
c) Is there an alternative remedy (tax saving clause)? 
 
a) Is the resident shareholder the enterprise (and the CFC fiscally transparent)? 
 
The view that the shareholder is deemed to be the enterprise aligns with the concept that CFC 
rules had a similar pattern of operation to partly fiscally transparent entities, and is not a new 
idea in tax treaties.241 That foundation stems from the pattern of taxing an amount of the CFC 
at the level of the shareholder irrespective of the CFC’s tax residence.242 Thus, the logic can 
accord with South African CFC rules because the premise is that CFC rules can only apply 
when the CFC is a tax resident for tax treaty purposes outside of South Africa.243 
 
The feature of fiscal transparency considers the share of the transparent entity’s income, 
depending on that nature, to be derived by the resident recipient or to be the profits of an 
enterprise carried on by that resident.244 That conception was traditionally applied to 
beneficiaries of trusts or partners in partnerships, although the OECD definition holds whether 
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that entity has a legal personality and is itself a tax resident person (partly fiscally transparent) 
or not (wholly fiscally transparent).245  
 
The definition of fiscal transparency was added to the commentary to the 2017 model tax 
convention to clarify situations where the domestic tax law of one contracting state taxes the 
income (or part thereof) of an entity not at the level of the entity, but at the level of persons 
who have an interest in the entity.246 It was also included as a provision to the 2017 model tax 
convention that stated the same.247 
 
Article 1(2) states: 
 
‘For the purposes of this Convention, income derived by or through an entity or 
arrangement that is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent under the tax law of 
either Contracting State shall be considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting 
State but only to the extent that the income is treated, for purposes of taxation by that 
State, as the income of a resident of that State.’248 
 
Thus, when article 7(1) applies to the tax on an amount of income of a CFC for the resident 
shareholder, the enterprise is seen to be carried on by the resident shareholder and is taxed in 
that resident’s state.249 The view of the CFC itself then switches. As the shareholder carries on 
the enterprise in the shareholder’s state on the share of that income, the CFC state is the state 
where the shareholder has a permanent establishment.250 That is because the CFC state is where 
the business is generated. That same approach is taken with respect to partially transparent 
entities that have distinct legal personalities or otherwise not legally transparent.251  
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For tax treaties, from the perspective that the shareholder has the enterprise, relief is then 
provided in Article 7(1) by way of a credit for foreign taxes that may have been paid by the 
CFC as the permanent establishment.252  
 
Paragraph 11.1 of the 2017 commentary to Articles 23A and B provides a similar logic when 
resident/resident-based attributions occur (akin to CFC rules), that is, when the same income 
or capital may be taxed by each contracting state as income or capital of one of its residents.253 
Paragraph 8 of that commentary continues to provide an example that this treatment only 
applies to the state of the resident shareholder and does not prescribe how the CFC state has to 
proceed on relieving that same tax.254 
 
Thus, in the case that the shareholder carries on the enterprise, Article 7(1) is given full effect 
for the shareholder. This means that the ‘as if’ fiction from domestic tax law is also given a full 
effect and does not conflict with tax treaties. The question is if the result is any different to the 
view of National Treasury, that is, that tax treaties are unaffected by CFC rules because a CFC 
charge is a tax on different taxpayers?255  
 
The only difference is that tax treaties may be considered in the cases of resident/resident-based 
attributions as described above. The effect, however, is precisely the same as simply providing 
a unilateral tax credit as stated by National Treasury and provided by section 9D without 
conflict. 
 
b) Is the CFC the enterprise and is there a potential conflict with article 7(1) and the 
basis of taxation set by the definition of permanent establishment? 
 
In this case, a CFC rule deems an amount of sales income to the owned by the shareholder, but 
the shareholder does not carry on the enterprise of the CFC. The applicability of Article 7(1) 
to the shareholder in that case is the double taxation arising from a resident/resident-based 
attribution on an amount of the same sales deemed to be owned and taxed for the shareholder 
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in two resident states – following the logic of the Anson and Smallwood cases, and the view of 
Lang that Article 7(1) may relieve double economic taxation.256  
 
A critical question arising from the above is how tax treaties address residence/residence-based 
taxation on the same profits of an enterprise without the concurrent enterprise or creation of a 
permanent establishment in the other state? 
 
The solution to this question can be seen in Article 7(1), which determines that for the tax to 
be charged consistently on the CFC’s enterprise in the shareholder state, that is, the profits of 
the CFC remain sourced from a foreign enterprise, there needs to exist a permanent 
establishment in the resident shareholder state for an amount of those same sales to be taxed 
therein. If no permanent establishment exists in the resident shareholder state, Article 7(1) may 
relieve the tax charged by a CFC rule. 
 
The first example of this effect can be seen in the logic of Fowler regarding the tax on business 
profits when Mr Fowler was a non-resident and had no permanent establishment in the state 
the profits were taxed.257 Recall that the Fowler case involved determining the ‘as if’ fiction 
that treated employment income in the United Kingdom as carrying on a trade. Mr Fowler was 
a non-resident and taxed on the basis of a fictional trade arising from employment income he 
rendered in the United Kingdom.  
 
As a non-resident, the tax authorities argued that the basis of taxation of business profits was 
the existence of a permanent establishment carried on by that foreign enterprise in the United 
Kingdom.258 By simply treating the income from employment as the fictional profits from 
trade, Mr Fowler did not carry on business through a permanent establishment. The tax 
authorities therefore argued that this was an indication that the article 7 was not the appropriate 
tax treaty article to deal with tax on ‘profits’ without the creation of a permanent 
establishment.259  
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The First Tier Tribunal rejected the above argument, concluding that the scope of article 7(1) 
intended, without a doubt, to apply to tax that was charged on ‘profits of a trade’.260 What 
article 7(1) also required was for those profits to have arisen from the carrying on of business 
attributable to a permanent establishment in the United Kingdom. That view was also 
illustrated by the majority decision in the court of appeal, finding that tax treaty exemption 
applied to eliminate the charge on trading profits of non-residents without a permanent 
establishment in the United Kingdom.261 That is, treating employment as trade did not also 
create a fictional permanent establishment for that income as a basis of taxability. The profits 
were therefore exempt without a permanent establishment. 
 
The second and most significant example adopting this same logic, followed soon after the 
British decision of Bricom in the French decision of Re Société Schneider Electric.262 The case 
dealt with French CFC rules that taxed the profitable results of a Swiss resident company for 
the French resident shareholder.263  
 
The Conseil D'etat (French Supreme Administrative Court) found that the taxable profits in 
the name of the French shareholder company, had an identity in nature to the profits of the 
Swiss enterprise.264 The profits attributable to a French enterprise based on the Swiss entity, 
taxed in Switzerland, were only taxable in France if the French resident entity carried on the 
enterprise which generated those profits through a permanent establishment in France. The 
case illustrated that article 7(1) may relieve double economic taxation in CFC rules, being the 
tax on the same profits of the Swiss CFC taxed in the name of the French shareholder because 
the profits attributable to French shareholders had to be derived through a permanent 
establishment in France to be taxed therein. The case resolved that: 
 
‘Consequently, one could deduce that since taxation established by internal law on certain 
income would lead indirectly, while the objective application of the convention would attribute 
to France the right to tax such income, to the contravention of other provisions of the 
convention, you should conclude that the convention prevents the taxation in France of this 
income.’265 
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In South Africa, a similar logic to the relationship between tax on profits and a permanent 
establishment for non-resident’s was argued in the case of L.J. Downing v SIR.266 Downing 
was a Swiss resident who held a portfolio investment of shares that was maintained by a general 
broker in South Africa that made substantial profits. The tax authorities sought to tax Mr 
Downing on profits. On appeal, the court found that in the absence of having a permanent 
establishment in South Africa, the business profits article 7(1) of the tax treaty with Switzerland 
provided an exemption from South African tax. The court held that if nothing more than 
‘profits’ exists, there was no business carried on for the purpose of article 7(1) through a 
permanent establishment, finding: 
 
‘We have come to the conclusion, therefore, that it having been shown that the “business” in 
question was carried on otherwise than though a permanent establishment in the Republic, the 
appellant is exempt from tax in the Republic in respect of the profits, in terms of Article 7(1).’267 
 
 
Therefore, article 7(1) determines that the profits from an enterprise of a contracting state are 
not taxable in South Africa, unless that enterprise has a permanent establishment in South 
Africa. That basis of argument was the same in case of the same taxpayer, such as Fowler, or 
one taxpayer based on another taxpayer, such as Schneider.  
 
Thus, when South African CFC rules tax an amount of sales income of a foreign enterprise, 
that is not also attributable to a permanent establishment in South Africa, article 7(1) may 
exempt a CFC rule. In that case, a unilateral credit is not the same as tax treaty exemption. The 
view of National Treasury therefore conflicts with this logic.268 In order to remedy this, an 
alternative hypothetical recourse is described as below. 
 
c) Is there an alternative remedy (the tax saving clause)? 
 
In states adopting a CFC rule, the design of these rules can be largely attributable to the United 
States who conceived and first enacted CFC legislation in 1962 to eliminate CFC deferral. 
From 1937 until the time of CFC legislation, the tax system in the United States already taxed 
corporate investment income, that is ‘passive income’, in foreign jurisdictions as sources 
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deemed to in the United States through its passive holding company regime, by piercing the 
veil of the foreign entity owned by tax residents of the United States.269  
 
This result was that the remaining ‘active income’ generated by the CFC itself was not taxed 
in order for United States domestic entities to remain competitive with their offshore 
counterparts.270 For multinationals, the mobility of operations meant that the distinction as to 
what generated active income may have been of no economic consequence. The result that the 
holding company regime was ineffective on passive income effectively connected to the 
preponderance of active income. This position gave rise to avoidance.  
 
The threat that diversion of business from the United States to lower tax jurisdictions for 
immediate tax savings had already grown, and in the 1950’s the United States was running a 
large deficit for the first time in years with a record low economic growth rate of two per cent 
from a longstanding average of three.271 Meanwhile other countries ravaged from World War 
II still reported double and triple-digit growth.272  
 
A causal factor identified by the Kennedy Administration was the United States multinational 
investment in foreign subsidiaries, an issue remedied by introducing CFC rules. What CFC 
rules did was to look into the CFC’s income, including sales and services, to tax the same 
income but as a source in the United States.273 There are two fundamental components from 
this.  
 
i. The effect of double taxation on the income in the CFC 
 
Since the shareholders of the CFC were United States residents, those shareholders were 
subjected to unlimited taxation on the attributed CFC income sourced in the United States. 
What arose, however, was double taxation on the income deemed to be sourced in the United 
States that was also taxed in the CFC state. Unilateral relief was then available in the United 
States on the same income computed by way of a tax credit.  
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ii. The effect of CFC rules in tax treaties with the United States 
 
Before CFC rules, foreign ‘active income’ like business profits, was not taxable in the United 
States.274 The adoption of CFC rules in the interactions with tax treaties did not seem to be a 
question of consequence. An example appears in article 13(1) and (2) of the United States 1945 
tax treaty with the United Kingdom, that affirmed the position of the United States and the 
taxation of United States nationals including corporate residents.275  
 
Article 3 covered ‘industrial and commercial profits’, similar to OECD Model Tax Convention 
in Article 7. It generally distributed the taxing rights on profits of the CFC enterprise to the 
CFC state, unless it was carried on by a resident through a permanent establishment in the 
United States. Thus, by sourcing the CFC’s income in the United States, the United States 
continued to tax the income of a CFC even when the non-resident CFC did not carry on an 
enterprise through a permanent establishment in the United States. Where the same income 
continued to be taxable in both countries, the solution in those situations was to be addressed 
by article 13 of that treaty; Article 13(1) and (2) stated: 
 
13(1): Subject to section 131 of the United States Internal Revenue Code as in effect on the 
first day of January, 1945, United Kingdom tax shall be allowed as a credit against United 
States tax. 
 
13(2): Subject to such provisions (which shall not affect the general principle hereof) as may 
be enacted in the United Kingdom, United States tax payable in respect of income from sources 
within the United States shall be allowed as a credit against any United Kingdom tax payable 
in respect of that income.276 
 
Section 131 of the United States Internal Revenue Code was the provision which allowed relief 
by way of a foreign tax credit in respect of income also accrued to a foreign country during the 
taxable year. Article 13(2) established a general principle that relief by way of the tax treaty 
was limited to a tax credit when the United States also sourced the same income the tax treaty 
allocated. This addition was an extension of the unilateral provision that was also bilaterally 
inserted into the tax treaty in order to limit any tax treaty relief available for states contracted 
with the United States. By providing a tax credit, any contracting state with a rate of tax lower 
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than the United States would not be relieved, allowing the United States to eliminate the risks 
associated with deferral and diverted income. 
 
In 1966, after adopting its CFC regime, the United States agreed a protocol to its tax treaty 
with the United Kingdom to amend article 13(2), which changed the reference from ‘tax 
payable’ to ‘computed by reference to the same profits’. This was to identify that a domestic 
attribution would still qualify for tax treaty relief when the income computed resulting in 
double taxation was not the same character of income in two jurisdictions.277  
 
In 1975, unrelated to the above, that tax treaty was renegotiated on the OECD model tax 
convention, and included a new provision in Article 1(3): 
 
Notwithstanding any provision of this Convention except paragraph 4 of this article, a 
contracting state may tax its residents ... and its nationals as if this Convention had not come 
into effect.278 
 
Paragraph 1(3) contained a new tax ‘saving clause’ under which each contracting state reserved 
the right to tax its nationals and residents under article 4 as if the convention had not come into 
effect.279 The savings clause was of principal importance to the United States because the 
United States taxed its citizens, residents, and corporations on a worldwide basis, regardless of 
where they resided or derived income. 
 
Paragraph 1(4) detailed a number of exceptions to the general savings clause that reflected 
overriding policies to the treaty distributive rules.280 Most importantly, the exception did not 
restrict benefits to the elimination of double taxation provided in article 23 [which was article 
13(2) as it was in the 1945 tax treaty and 1966 protocol]. The business profits article, article 7, 
was not one of the exceptions, which meant the relief from double taxation by way of article 7 
resorted to the basis of relief as it was detailed in article 23 (as it were in 1945 and 1966).   
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Thus, the basis of attributing business profits in the form of CFC income, because it was also 
a deemed source rule in the United States, was not affected by the exemption requirements 
provided in article 7 on that same income. This arose because article 7 was subject to article 
23, and therefore exemption by way of article 7 was limited to relief provided by way of credit 
when the income was also sourced in the United States by way of article 23. In all other cases, 
article 7 was unaffected as it allowed for exemption of all foreign active business that was not 
otherwise sourced in the United States by CFC rules. 
 
CFC rules were, therefore, never a conceptual issue for the United States when their tax treaties 
included an express override to tax treaty benefits, even when the character of the CFC income 
was unchanged. 
 
From the above view, it is submitted that the tax arising from a domestic CFC rule still has to 
be interpreted in the context of tax treaties, on the basis that CFC rules could not themselves 
override tax treaties for covered persons. As explained next, an over-ride clause may play an 
important role. 
 
When the effect of a CFC rule is such that a CFC is taxed on a residence-basis of taxation in 
the CFC’s tax resident state, and the shareholder of a CFC is taxed based on a CFC’s profit 
arising from a CFC rule in the shareholder’s tax resident state, there is a resident/resident-based 
form of double taxation. Since the CFC itself never becomes a tax resident in the shareholder 
state, but in effect is taxed on a resident basis of on an amount therein in the hands of the 
shareholder, from the shareholder’s view, a question may arises as to the source of the income 
for the purposes of tax treaties. Since tax treaties have their own sourcing rules281, a tax treaty 
that applies to the shareholder who is a tax resident may, therefore, require that income to be 
attributed in accordance with the rule of the model tax convention.  
 
Before this discussion, however, and by way of contrast, recall that the finding in Bricom was 
that the tax arising from a CFC rule was based on notional income. In this view, it has been 
found that the amount of ‘income’ subject to tax had no particular source282, even in tax treaties. 
The amount that was taxed based on the income generated by the CFC would not fall into tax 
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treaties on the basis of source rules, even when the amount was essentially the same CFC 
income. An amount of notional income would, therefore, not necessarily override tax treaties 
because the income itself was not the same income as the CFC.  
 
As it stands, however, South Africa has a variety of tax treaties that have a ‘subject to’ override 
clause in the relief articles that would not preclude application of CFC rules should the concept 
of notional income and notional source be contested. One being article 22 of the Australia tax 
treaty (1997), article 22(3) of the Canada tax treaty (1997), Article 21(3) with the United 
Kingdom tax treaty (2003), and Article 21(2)(c) in the United States tax treaty (1997).283 No 
such clause exists for example, in the relief articles of the German tax treaty (1975), the 
Luxembourg tax treaty (2000), the Netherlands tax treaty (2009), the New Zealand tax treaty 
(2002), the Singapore tax treaty (2017), the Switzerland tax treaty (2009), the Swedish tax 
treaty (1998) or the United Arab Emirates tax treaty (2016). The significance of this clause is 
explained below. 
 
iii. Interaction with tax treaties with an override clause in South Africa 
 
Article 7(1) would not apply to section 9D when tax treaties contain an override clause. If there 
is a subject to tax clause, it is necessary to refer to that method of relief first.  
 
For example, the South Africa-United Kingdom tax treaty (2003) states for the elimination of 
double taxation: 
 
21(2)(a): ‘South African tax payable under the laws of South Africa and in accordance with 
this Convention…shall be allowed as a credit against any United Kingdom tax computed by 
reference to the same profits, income or chargeable gains by reference to which the South 
African tax is computed’ 
 
21(3): ‘For the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article, profits, income and capital gains owned 
by a resident of the United Kingdom which may be taxed in South Africa in accordance with 
this Convention shall be deemed to arise from sources in South Africa.’284 
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21(2)(a) is not itself conclusive as the tax that arises must be ‘in accordance with the 
convention’. Article 7(1) sets the basis of taxation that limits the source state, being South 
Africa, from taxing the sales income of the CFC unless it is attributable to a permanent 
establishment of the enterprise.285 In accordance with the convention, that income is, therefore, 
exempt from tax and prevents a CFC charge. 
 
Article 21(3) then intervenes, in that, for the purposes of 21(2), the amount of taxable sales is 
deemed to arise from sources in South Africa when the convention allows taxation in another 
state. In article 7(1), South Africa may only levy tax on an amount of sales income sourced 
from the CFC when the amount of sales are attributable to a permanent establishment in South 
Africa. Thus, it is submitted that the inclusion of Article 21(3) may create a fictional sourcing 
rule for the purposes of article 7(1), that is, akin to the shareholder carrying on a fictional 
business in the form of a fictional ‘deemed’ permanent establishment. A deemed permanent 
establishment would effectively source accord with article 7(1). 
 
The override clause, therefore, allows taxation by way of CFC rules in South Africa without 
relief by way of Article 7(1). This is by creating a ‘deemed’ permanent establishment and relief 
being provided by way of tax credit. This effect is, therefore, the same as a unilateral credit 
without tax treaty relief. 
 
4.5. CFC rule developments in the OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
In addition to the new fiscal transparency clause as discussed in this chapter,286 there have been 
several updates to the OECD model tax convention in order to address the perceived conflict 
with CFC rules in tax treaties. More notably, the 2017 update to the model tax convention 
which resembles the ‘saving clause’ on United States citizens as discussed above. 
 
Before this, however, the OECD acknowledged the Bricom decision by amending the 2003 
Commentary to the model tax convention for the so-called tax on residents.287 Paragraph 14 of 
the Commentary to article 7(1) states:  
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The purpose of paragraph 1 is to limit the right of one Contracting State to tax the business 
profits of enterprises of the other Contracting State. As confirmed by paragraph 3 of Article 1, 
the paragraph does not limit the right of a Contracting State to tax its own residents under 
controlled foreign companies provisions found in its domestic law, even though such tax 
imposed on these residents may be computed by reference to the part of the profits of an 
enterprise that is resident of the other Contracting State that is attributable to these residents’ 
participation in that enterprise.288 
 
That view confirmed that a CFC rule was not prevented by tax treaties simply because the 
income attributed to a state’s own resident was also computed by reference to the income of 
another resident in a foreign jurisdiction. That is, it confirmed the concept of a purely notional 
income as was held in Bricom. The status of Commentaries as binding context has created 
much in the way of debate, however.289 Thus, more recently, the OECD may have affirmed the 
above position with the introduction of the ‘saving clause’ in article 1(3) of the 2017 OECD 
model tax convention on the relationship between the tax on residents and tax treaties.290 This 
concretised the view that that even where the concept of notional income may be contested, 
Article 7(1) may not provide relief from double economic taxation. This wording appears to 
be very similar to the operation of the saving clause conceived by the United States discussed 
above.  
 
Article 1(3) states: 
 
‘This Convention shall not affect the taxation, by a Contracting State, of its residents except 
with respect to the benefits granted under paragraph 3 of Article 7, paragraph 2 of Article 9 and 
Articles 19, 20, 23 [A] [B], 24, 25 and 28.’ 
 
Article 7(1) is not one of the above exceptions. Thus, it appears that the double economic 
taxation arising from a CFC rule may not be provided relief through Article 7(1), as a tax 
arising on resident/resident-based attributions. 
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In addition, paragraph 1 of article 23A, which provides relief by way of tax treaty exemption 
is also restricted, and now applies: 
 
‘…except to the extent that these provisions allow taxation by that other State solely because 
the income is also income derived by a resident of that State’291 [that is, subject to Article 1(3)]. 
 
4.6. Summary of findings 
 
This chapter looked at a hypothetical fact pattern using sales income from a CFC as the basis 
of an ‘as if’ fiction in South African CFC rules. At a domestic level, unlike the Bricom case, 
Chapters Two and Three built on the presumption that the ‘as if’ fiction may not have been 
purely notional. The Fowler case confirmed an alternative view that supported the ‘as if’ akin 
to statutory deeming. With that finding, a CFC rule taxes the CFC shareholder on an amount 
of the same CFC’s income, which in this chapter used an example of deemed sales income. A 
CFC rule, therefore, results in a resident/resident-based form of double taxation, because the 
effect of a CFC rule is such that a CFC is taxed on a residence-basis of taxation in the CFC’s 
tax resident state, and the shareholder of a CFC is taxed based on a CFC’s profit arising from 
a CFC rule in the shareholder’s tax resident state.  
 
The most likely conflict with CFC rules and tax treaties would arise with Article 7(1) because 
the view is that an enterprise and profits may be separate concepts. In tax treaties, for South 
African CFC rules to apply, the resident shareholder must generate the profits by carrying on 
an enterprise and not simply being taxed on profits. That effect found one of two potential 
outcomes that could source the same ‘income’ in South Africa in accordance with tax treaties. 
 
The first was that the shareholder carried on the enterprise and thus the income was the income 
of the shareholder’s enterprise, which meant that the CFC was treated as fiscally transparent in 
a sense. Thus, the view in Article 7(1) switched the CFC as an enterprise to the CFC as a 
permanent establishment. This was, in effect, the same as providing a unilateral tax credit for 
foreign taxes paid in the CFC state. This also accorded with the new Article 1(2) of the 2017 
OECD Model Tax Convention that includes a new transparency clause. 
 
                                                        





The second was that the CFC was the enterprise and the income was taxed for the resident 
shareholder. In this way, what occurred was a conflict with section 7(1) as the taxpayer needed 
to have an enterprise with a permanent establishment and not merely profits to tax the CFC 
enterprise in South Africa.  To remedy this scenario, there are override clauses in certain of 
South Africa’s tax treaties, similar to the United States, that finds that income taxed in South 
Africa is also sourced in South Africa.  
 
This also accords with the new ‘tax saving’ clause included in the 2007 OECD Model Tax 
Convention. Using an amount of sales income as an example, this means that the sourcing rule 
deems the enterprise to transfer to the shareholder and create a permanent establishment, thus, 







CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSION 
 
 
This minor dissertation determined that the effect of the ‘as if’ statutory fiction is not a notional 
definition but rather, a deeming rule. The finding arose in the Bricom case which determined 
that an ‘as if’ fiction was defined notionally and was, therefore, not the actual ‘income’ itself, 
but an amount based on actual income. Thus, if X was taxed ‘as if’ it was Y, the ‘as if’ 
introduced a fictional element that was not the same as Y’s actual income. The tax computed 
on an amount ‘as if’ it was Y’s income was, therefore, not the same as Y’s actual income. The 
result was that the fiction ‘as if’ it was Y was a distinct concept separate from Y and, therefore, 
not the same income. The notional amount was not, therefore, afforded tax treaty relief. 
 
In Fowler, the effect of ‘as if’ re-emerged as a deeming rule, that is to say, it was not a notional 
definition and the fiction supported the full ordinary meaning being provided to the ‘as if’ 
terminology. Thus, the logic follows that if X was taxed ‘as if’ it was Y, it was Y’s same income 
that was taxed for X. The tax computed with reference to a fictional amount of Y’s income and 
Y’s actual income meant they were one and the same. Thus, if they are to be regarded as the 
same income, they were not separate concepts and could not be notionally defined. The result 
was that the tax on X ‘as if’ it was Y was, therefore, calculated on Y’s actual income. The 
income was, therefore, subject to tax treaty relief. 
 
The theory of ‘as if’ formulated by Vaihinger and the theoretical effect of ‘as if’ regarded one 
subject matter ‘just as’ another. The case of Fowler thus accorded with this theory as it meant 
that the ‘as if’ fiction had a deeming aspect which was the same as the nature of the income 
that it was deemed to be. In regard to the case of two taxpayers, for example a CFC and the 
shareholder, this meant that taxpayer X was taxed ‘as if’ X was Y, which meant that Y was 
‘just as’ X – it was therefore the same income of Y for X. Accordingly, the ‘as if’ was not a 
notional definition, but a deeming rule of Y’s income or activity for X.  
 
In addition, caselaw generally supported the view to domestic fictions, which stated that an 
ordinary meaning could be given to fiction. The fictional definition was, therefore, not a 
notional definition. In addition, a fiction which was a computation based on or computed with 
reference to actual income, simply meant it was the same income that was taxed, and was 





if’, simply meant that the shareholder is taxed just as the CFC and just as the CFC was a tax 
resident taxpayer, akin to a deeming rule on the same CFC’s income or activity.  
 
By consolidating the above views in CFC rules, the ‘as if’ results in the taxation of one resident 
taxpayer – the CFC, and the taxation on that same income attributed to another taxpayer, the 
shareholder – a resident/resident-based attribution of double taxation therefore arises. In these 
cases, tax treaty relief may be afforded to taxpayers when the tax in one state was computed 
with reference to the same income in the hands of two different tax residents – so called, double 
economic taxation. That is, when one taxpayer’s income was used to determine the tax liability 
of the other taxpayer, as was found in the Anson and Smallwood cases respectively. 
 
The above findings were tested in a hypothetical case study using ‘sales’ income in a CFC. The 
effect of ‘as if’ meant that the shareholder was taxed on an amount of deemed sales from the 
CFC. In tax treaties, Article 7(1) had a potential conflict with CFC rules by questioning who 
carries on the business generating the sales, that is, who is regarded as carrying on the 
enterprise. That effect found one of two potential views to the same sales in South Africa in 
accordance with Article 7(1). 
 
The first was that the shareholder carried on the enterprise and thus the amount of income was 
the income of the shareholder’s enterprise, which meant that the CFC was treated as fiscally 
transparent in a sense. Thus, the view in Article 7(1) switched the CFC as an enterprise to the 
CFC as a permanent establishment. This was, in effect, the same as providing a unilateral tax 
credit for foreign taxes paid in the CFC state. This also accorded with the new Article 1(2) of 
the 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention that includes a new transparency clause. 
 
The second was that the CFC was the enterprise and the resident shareholder was taxed on an 
amount of business profits from a non-resident (the CFC’s) enterprise. In this way, what 
occurred was a conflict with article 7(1) because the shareholder did not carry on the enterprise 
of the CFC or create a permanent establishment to which the sales were attributed. To remedy 
this scenario, there are ‘saving’ override clauses in certain of South Africa’s tax treaties similar 
to the United States that finds that income taxed in South Africa is also sourced in South Africa, 






The above effect is similar to the new ‘tax saving’ clause in article 1(3) included in the 2017 
OECD Model Tax Convention which limits the tax treaty exemption arising from Article 7(1) 
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